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DAMAGES UNDER THE FEDERAL EMPLOYERS'
LIABILITY ACT
WILLIAM H. DEPARCQ* AND CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT :
"The Federal Employers' Liability Act," according to Mr. Justice
Douglas, "was designed to put on the railroad industry some of the cost
for the legs, eyes, arms, and lives which it consumed in its operations."'
It has largely accomplished that purpose. Thanks in no small measure to
a Supreme Court which has been vigilant in its protection of the rights
which the Act gives the workingman, the railroads have been made to
pay for the human beings they have damaged or destroyed. Although the
Act does not make the railroads insurers of their employees, it is a rare
case indeed when there is a total failure of compensation for the victims
of a railroad accident.2
But while the substantive liability of the railroads has become thus
firmly established, much less attention has been given to the amount the
railroads must pay for the legs, eyes, arms and lives they consume. It
is not enough that the employers provide somw compensation; instead the
Act contemplates that they should pay fair compensation. It is especially
true of FELA actions that, as one scholar says, "the crucial controversy
in personal injury torts today is not in the area of liability but of damages." 3
The Act itself sets out no measure of damages. The courts, quite
properly, have held that awards for injuries are to be determined accord-
ing to the principles developed for common law negligence actions, and
that recoveries for death should be commensurate with the pecuniary
*Attorney-at-Law, Minneapolis, Minnesota.
" Associate Professor of Law, University of Texas.
1Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U. S. 53, 68 (1949) (concurring opinion).
2 DeParcq, A Decade of Progress under the Federal Employers' Liability Act,
18 L. & CONTEMP. PROn. 257, 279 (1953).
3 Jaffe, Damages for Personal Injury: The Impact of Insurance, 18 L. &
CONTEMP. PROB. 219, 221 (1953). And see Hare, Book Review, 8 ALA. L. Ray. 440,
441 (1956): "The greatest paradox in the field of torts has always been the
technical precision required in every other aspect of the trial in contrast with the
slovenly treatment of unliquidated damages. No business man would tolerate for
a second a procedure which put a price on his property or his time in this vague
and slipshod way. How have judges for a hundred years been telling juries to
set a price on the loss suffered by the plaintiff in the way of physical impairment
and bodily 'pain? The customary instruction to the jury is itself an admission of
ineptness--'Gentlemen of the jury, there is no yardstick which you can use, etc.'
A business buyer or seller would throw up his hands at such guess work. The
modern trial of a law suit offers a jury sensible assistance in calculating a verdict
for the plaintiff. Belli's is the first major legal text which has fertilized this arid
field, and its importance is incalculable. All the legal scholarship in the field of
torts is preliminary to the ultimate question of 'how much.' Until the amount is
set it is but sounding brass and. a tinkling cymbal. It is incredible that it was left
for the past decade to devote any serious attention to this consummation of the
trial."
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loss according to the rules developed under Lord Campbell's Act and
comparable state wrongful death statutes.4 Nevertheless it is possible
to consider FELA damage rules as a distinctive branch of the law: the
frequency and severity of injuries to railroad workmen has required
courts to answer questions not previously presented or settled in tort law
generally, and the insistence that the measure of damages must be
governed by a uniform federal standard has produced more coherent
results than is the case with other torts where each state is free to
follow its own vagaries.'
Before examining in detail the rules which have thus emerged and
the problems still undecided, it is well to indicate our own faith as to
damages in this class of litigation. We have no wish to press for the
"more than adequate award"; such an achievement, were it possible,
would be a Phyrric victory for injured employees. Truly excessive
verdicts would be an invitation to legislative action setting limits on
recovery, or remitting railroad workers to notoriously inadequate state
workmen's compensation systems. At the same time we insist on the
right of the injured person to full and fair compensation for his in-
juries. Excessive concern for the corporate pocketbook has led some courts
to hold the employer liable for only part of the loss he has caused, and
to require the injured person, or his widow, to shoulder the balance of
the loss.' This seems to us a perversion of the Act. The sleek new light-
weight passenger trains which the railroad industry is now purchasing
cost millions of dollars, but no one suggests that because the expense
is so vast, General Motors or Budd should sell these trains to the
railroads at less than cost. By the same token, the railroads should pay
full price for a leg or a life.
Of course there is no price tag on people. It is easier for us to
demand full and fair compensation than to decide what amount fits
this description in a particular case. There are rules which set out the
elements to be considered, and we shall shortly examine these rules in
detail. The problem is in translating these elements into dollars and
cents. A smart and industrious switchman makes $400 a month at age
24, when he is permanently disabled. What would his earning capacity
have been at age 40? At 60? How much must be paid to orphaned
children to compensate them, fully and fairly, for the loss of the care
and guidance they might have expected from their father? How many
dollars should the railroad pay a person forced to go through life with
the devastating pain of a "phantom limb"?
We do not know the answers to these questions-nor do appellate
4 E.g., Michigan Central R. Co. v. Vreeland, 227 U. S. 59, 69-72 (1913).
r Following the example of the courts, however, we have cited non-FELA
cases from time to time in this article where they deal with common law principles
or with the interpretation of a wrongful death act which uses the same standard
for damages as does FELA.
6 See pp. 478-82 below.
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judges. The best approximation to fair answers is likely to be achieved
by leaving such matters to the common sense and the enlightened con-
science of a jury. The jury should be provided with all the data that
expert testimony can give. It should have the benefit of careful instruc-
tions as to the things it is to consider. It should be protected from
appeals to passion and prejudice. If these conditions are met, the answer
of the jury should be final. Questions involved in assessing damages are
of a sort which juries are peculiarly well suited to decide. If ultimate
decision of these questions is taken away from the jury, then that ancient
and honorable institution becomes useless save for Fourth of July orations.
Against this background of our beliefs, we turn now to the rules
for measuring damages in an action under the Federal Employers'
Liability Act. We look first to the basic amount of loss, the elements
for which recovery can be had. Thereafter we shall consider the
period for which this loss is compensable, the reduction to present
worth of the amount thus indicated, and finally, appellate review.
I. BAsIc AMOUNT OF Loss
Personal injury actions
There is no great difficulty in computing damages for a minor
injury, which has completely healed by the time of trial. Plaintiff can
recover his lost earnings, his medical expenses, and a reasonable allow-
ance for the pain caused by the injury. Practically all such cases are
settled, since the amounts involved are small, and the only real dispute
is as to the allowance for intangibles.7
Difficulty arises when the injury is such as to cause some form of
permanent harm, whether partial or total. Because the losses to be
compensated for stretch over many years, they will add up into sizable
amounts, well worth fighting about. And the long look into the future
which is demanded of the jury necessarily requires it to resolve many
imponderables, which reasonable men can evaluate in different ways.
Finally, while damages up to the date of trial need only be established
by a fair preponderance of the evidence, future damages must be
demonstrated with reasonable certainty.'
Perhaps the most important factor for which the permanently dis-
abled person can recover is the injury to his earning power. A useful con-
cept developed by common law judges is that the recovery is not for the lost
future earnings themselves, but for the impairment of earning capacity.9
7 Perhaps it is because most injuries do heal, and calculation of damages in
such cases is so simple, that so few FELA claims ever involve any litigation at all.
One study finds that only 2% of the claims are litigated and still fewer have
full-blown trials. Conard, Workmen's Compensation: Is It More Efficient than
Employer's Liability.4, 38 A.B.A.J. 1011, 1014 (1952).
8 Watt v. Nevada Cent. R. Co., 23 Nev. 154, 175, 44 Pac. 423, 429 (1896);
DeParcq, Evaluation for Settlement or Trial, 24 TENN. L. REv. 172, 177 (1956).
But cf. MCCORMIcK, DAMAGaS 309 (1935).
9ld. at 309-11; James, Damages in Accident Cases, 41 CORNELL L. Q. 582,
598-9 (1956).
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In automobile accident cases and similar tort litigation, this is of very
great importance, for it permits recovery though the injured person was
out of work or though he was so wealthy that he did not need to work.10
Neither of these situations is likely to arise in a FELA case; by definition
the injured person will have been employed at the time of the accident,'
and his earnings at that time will be the principal proof of the value of
his earning capacity. 2 Though all past earnings would be relevant,
plaintiff will usually introduce only his earnings record for a year or so
before the accident. Because of the tendency for wages to increase, an
earnings history over a longer period is likely to show average earnings
smaller than those plaintiff was actually enjoying when he was injured.
Of course the jury is not bound by the history of past earnings.
Earning power is not a constant, and the jury is free to assess it realistic-
ally. The jury, considering all the innate qualities, background, and
training of the injured person, must decide what were his future pros-
pects for an increase, or even a decrease, in his earning capacitv."3 Appel-
late courts, in holding a verdict excessive by comparing it to the present
worth of future earnings as shown by past earning experience, have
sometimes overlooked the possibility that the jury may have believed
the injured person's earnings would have increased. Other courts have
viewed the matter more sensibly. Thus in one case where the highest
earnings plaintiff had had before the injury were $250 a month, the
reviewing court held the jury could have awarded damages on the basis
of $300 or $350 a month, saying:
It cannot be assumed that his earning power would not increase
in future years. On the evidence adduced the jury had a right
to, and probably did, find that the earning power of the
plaintiff would increase.
14
In this manner "the law recognizes the possibilities open to ambition."' 5
By the same token, defendant has a right to argue, and the jury to
decide, that some allowance should be made for an eventual decline
1id. at 210 n. 3. And see note 97 infra.
11 But cf. O'Donnell v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 109 F. Supp. 590 (N. D.
Calif. 1951), where plaintiff was allowed to recover on a 12 months basis even
though in the past a pollen allergy had prevented him from working during two
or three months of the year. Since the allergy was not only seasonal but also
locational, the court held that he had capacity to work for the full 12 months.
12McCoRi~cK, DAMAGES 311 (1935). But cf. Muratore v. United States,
100 F. Supp. 276 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), where the court said that the past earnings
of a shipfitter were unduly high, because of the war situation and resulting over-
time, and assumed his future earnings would have been a smaller amount; Imperial
Oil, Ltd. v. Drlik, 234 F. 2d 4, 11-2 (6th Cir. 1956).
13 Hallada v. Great Northern Ry., 244 Minn. 81, 96, 69 N.W. 2d 673, 685
(1955), cert. denied 350 U. S. 874 (1955).
14 Bartlebaugh v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 78 N.E. 2d 410, 414 (Ohio App. 1948),
req.'d on other grounds 150 Ohio St. 387, 82 N.E. 2d 853 (1948).
15 MCCORMIcK, DAMAGE 300 (1935).
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of earning power because of the abatement of mental and physical
vigor consequent upon the passage of time.1"
A more perplexing problem is the extent to which evidence can
be introduced bearing on the possibility of future changes in earning
capacity. It is proper to show that between the time of the injury and
the time of trial wage increases have been made for persons in plaintiff's
position, which he would have had were he still working.' 7 And plaintiff
can show any fixed promotion scheme which would assure him of even-
tually increased earnings."8
Can the plaintiff go further, and introduce evidence that his
capabilities are such that future promotion is likely, and demonstrate
by such evidence the possible income he would receive after such pro-
motions? An old Supreme Court decision, decided prior to adoption of
FELA, said that it would be error to allow such testimony, on the ground
that it is too speculative. 9 We believe that this decision is no longer
authoritative. It speaks from a day when restrictive rules of evidence were
more highly esteemed than they are at present. All agree that the jury
may take future increases into account; any evidence bearing on the
possibility of such increases is relevant, and should be admissible, with
the jury determining how much weight to give it. The requirement of
reasonable certainty applies to the end result, the earning capacity as
proven to the jury, and not to the bits and pieces of evidence which
make up that proof. The only limit on admissibility of evidence showing
possible future income should be the power of the judge to exclude par-
ticular evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
risk that its admission will create substantial danger of misleading the
jury.20
The view which we espouse was adopted in a notable recent decision
by the New Mexico Supreme Court in a common law injuries action.
The plaintiff at the time of his injury was taking a training course as an
automobile mechanic, and receiving $100 a month as a laboratory
assistant. Testimony was admitted from the head of the school that
plaintiff's work was outstanding, that he was capable of becoming a
"ctopflight" mechanic, and that "topflight" mechanics make from $75 to
$150 a week. After an elaborate review of the authorities, the court
held this evidence proper, saying:
* * *any evidence that would fairly indicate his present earning
capacity, and the probability of its increase or decrease in the
future ought to be admitted. It may be that such testimony
16See 3oftin v. Wilson, 67 So. 2d 185, 189 (Fla. 1953).
17 Southern Pac. Co. v. Guthrie, 180 F. 2d 295, 302-3 (9th Cir. 1949), cert.
denied 341 U. S. 904 (1951).
18Richmond & D. R. Co. v. Elliott, 149 U. S. 266 (1893).
19 Ibid.
20 See UNIFORM RULES OF EViDENcE, RULE 45; DeParcq, The Uniform Rules:
.4 Plaintiff's View, 40 MINN. L. REV. 301, 327-8 (1956).
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is speculative, as asserted by defendant; but no more so than
any that has for its purpose the proof of future action or events.
It is all problematical at best. It is not questioned that mortality
tables are admissible, but possibly not one time in fifty would
the life expectancy of any individual come within a year of
the actual length of his life. It is, to say the least, problematical
whether he would continue to live, continue in health, continue
to work, continue to work with much the same effort and
ability he has shown in the past, continue to have the desire
and the opportunity to work. Also, that the amount of wages
paid him and those following his occupation generally in the
past, will continue to be paid; that the wage scale will not be
materially affected by depression, strikes, inflation, or war;
that interest rates will remain much as they are. However
'speculative' such testimony may be, it is the best tijat can be
produced to establish earning capacity over a period of years.
A jury of twelve average citizens ordinarily can be depended
on to assess damages fairly, after they have heard and con-
sidered such evidence.
21
Plaintiff's loss in a personal injury action is measured by his
gross earnings. 2  His personal living expenses are not deducted, as
they would be in a death action, since the injured person must continue
to bear those expenses, and they are not lessened by the injury. It is
gross earnings before taxes, rather than take-home pay, which provides
the measure. The effect of income taxes in tort litigation has stirred
up much excitement in the last few years, more, perhaps, than is justified
by its difficulty. Confusion has come from failure to distinguish what
must be regarded as four quite distinct questions. 1. Should income tax
be deducted from earnings in determining the damage to earning capacity
of an injured employee? 2. Should income tax be deducted from earnings
in determining the lost contributions the widow might have expected
from a deceased employee? 3. Should the trial court instruct the jury
that the amount it awards plaintiff is not taxable? 4. May defendant's
lawyer argue to the jury that the amount of the award is not taxable?
We shall take up each of these questions in its proper place. Our answer
to the 1st, 3rd, and 4th questions will be an unequivocal "No." As we
shall see, the 2nd question poses a more complicated problem which can-
not yet be resolved with assurance.
We are here confronted with the first question, deduction of income
21 Turrietta v. Wyche, 54 N.M. 5, 16, 212 P. 2d 1041, 1047-8 (1949). The
passage here set out was quoted with approval by the Illinois Supreme Court in
Allendorf v. Elgin, J. & E. Ry. Co., 8 Ill. 2d 164-, 133 N.E. 2d 288, 294 (1956).
See also Houlihan v. Turner Construction Co., 139 F. Supp. 88, 92 (D.R.I. 1956),
where evidence was held proper that an oiler, earning $91 a week at the time
of his injuries, had reached the point where he could qualify for the job of crane
operator at a much higher wage.
22 Cf. Vicksburg & M. R. Co. v. Putnam, 118 U. S. 545, 554 (1886); Rouse
v. New York, C. & St. L. R. Co., 349 Ill. App. 139, 110 N. E. 2d 266 (1953).
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taxes in measuring the lost earning capacity of an injured employee.
This is the easiest question, for while there is some difference of view
on the other facets of the problem, apparently all agree that gross earnings
before tax must be the measure in an injuries action. So far as we can
find, the only American decision to the contrary is the first decision of
the Ninth Circuit in Southern Pacific Co. v. Guthrie,2 and that court,
on rehearing when it studied the question more closely, substantially
repudiated that view.24 Subsequent cases have presented no ambiguity,
and the matter is now clear enough that an able federal judge, after
studying all the authorities, could conclude in a very recent case:
The courts seem well agreed that the future tax liability is sub-
ject to too many variables to be a matter of consideration in an
award for future impairment of earning capacity.
2 5
And the learned commentators support this result." By the same token,
other deductions, such as for railroad retirement, are not to be considered
in measuring the destroyed earning capacity.2 7
Valuation of the impaired earning capacity is complicated where
the plaintiff is not totally disabled,2" but retains some residual earning
23 180 F. 2d 295 (9th Cir. 1949).
24 186 F. 2d 926, 928 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied 341 U. S. 904 (1951).
25 Combs v. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry. Co., 135 F. Supp. 750, 751 (S. D.
Iowa 1955). Accord: Stokes v. United States, 144 F. 2d 82 (2d Cir. 1944) ; Chicago
& N. W. Ry. Co. v. Curl, 178 F. 2d 497 (8th Cir. 1949); O'Donnell v. Great
Northern Ry. Co., 109 F. Supp. 590 (N. D. Calif. 1951); Hall v. Chicago &
N. W. Ry. Co., 5 Ill. 2d 135, 125 N. E. 2d 77 (1955); Dempsey v. Thompson, 363
Mo. 339, 251.S.W. 2d 42 (1952); John F. Buckner & Sons v. Allen, 289 S.W. 2d
387 (Tex. Cir. App. 1956); Texas & N.O.R. Co. v. Pool, 263 S.W. 2d 582 (Tex.
Cir. App. 1953). Decisions from Canada, Australia, Scotland and New Zealand
are said to be to the same effect. Note, 51 COLUM. L. Rav. 782 (1951); Anno., 9
A.L.R. 2d 320. And an English decision which attracted much attention had held
that taxes are not to be deducted, Billingham v. Hughes, [1949] 1 L.B. 643 (C.A.).
A contrary view has now been taken, however, by a divided opinion of the House
of Lords. British Transp. Comm'n v. Gourley, [1955] 3 All E. R. 796 (H.L.),
criticized 69 HARv. L. REv. 1496 (1956).
28 Notes, 51 COLUM. L. REv. 782 (1951), 32 Tax. L. REv. 108 (1953), 32 NEB.
L. REv. 491 (1953), 8 SOUTHWESTERN L. 3. 97 (1953), 69 HARV. L. REv. 1496
(1956); Comments, 33 B.U.L. REv. 114 (1953), 21 U. of CHL L REV. 156 (1953).
27 Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. v. Curl, 178 F. 2d 497 (8th Cir. 1949); cf.
Sinovich v. Erie Railroad Co., 230 F. 2d 658 (3d Cir. 1956); Wawryszyn v.
Illinois Cent. R. Co., 10 Il. App. 2d 394, 135 N.E. 2d 154 (1956).
28 Plaintiff cannot recover for total and permanent disability if the injuries
can be cured or alleviated by a simple and safe surgical operation, but this rule
has been applied most cautiously. Thus it has been held that the dangers of the
operation are such that plaintiff need not submit to an operation to cure a ruptured
intervertebral disc, Lewis v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 100 F. Supp. 291, 294, (E. D.
Pa. 1951), or a lacerated low lumbar disc, Bordanaro v. Burstiner, 151 N.Y.S.
2d 450 (Sup. Ct. 1956), or a hernia, Missouri Pac. I Co. v. Bryant, 213 Ark.
149, 209 S.W. 2d 690 (1948), for the benefit of his employer. It is interesting to
compare the treatment of hernias under workmen's compensation statutes. E. g.,
National Mut. Cas. Co. v. Lowery, 136 Tex. 188, 148 S.W. 2d 1089 (1940).
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capacity. The rule in such a case is that plaintiff is entitled to the amount
he normally would have earned during the rest of his life had he not been
injured, but that from this must be deducted the sum which he may
reasonably be expected to earn despite his injuries.29 Determining the
value of this residual earning capacity is one of the most difficult and
conjectural problems in this whole subject matter. Suppose, for example,
that a young brakeman loses an arm. It is dear enough that he can no
longer work as a brakeman, but it is much less clear that he has totally
and completely lost his earning capacity in all occupations. Indeed it is
even possible that he might be able to readjust, go into a different field,
and like many other people with one arm, be quite successful. Such a case
may well lead to introduction of conflicting evidence as to whether
the size of the stump permits use of a prosthetic device; if it does, de-
fendant will doubtless present expert testimony as to all the things that
can be accomplished with an artificial arm and plaintiff will meet that,
by other testimony or by cross-examination, as the case permits.30
But after all this has been done, it is still extraordinarily difficult
to estimate how much a maimed person will earn for the rest of his life
in an occupation which he has never yet tried. There are tables available
indicating the percentage of disability caused by loss of a member or
members at a given age,31 and these should be admissible for whatever
they may be worth. But the education, intelligence, and experience of the
particular plaintiff make generalized tables an inexact guide.
And so, as on many other matters, there seems no solution save to
give the jury all the data possible, and leave it to the jury to make its
own best guess. The question is sure to be fully discussed by both sides
in closing argument. Plaintiffs' counsel are likely to find that the wisest
policy is to be frank with the jury about the possibility of future earnings
by the partially disabled plaintiff, and to suggest to the jury a reasonable
and realistic figure for the amount plaintiff may be able to earn.
In addition to the damages for loss of earning capacity, plaintiff
may recover for medical expenses, past and future, such as the attendance
of doctors and nurses, hospital care, and medicines and appliances. The
amount of these expenses, of course, must be proved; even with regard
to past expenses actually incurred, the safer practice is to produce a
physician to testify that the charges are reasonable and customary. 2
29 E.g., Hallada v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 244 Minn. S1, 69 N.W. 2d 673
(1955), cert. denied 350 U.S. 874 (1955). As to the problems of computing present
worth where there is residual earning capacity, see p. 463 below.
30 For description of such a case, see DeParcq, Foundations for Liability,
24 TENN. L. REV. 182 (1956).
3 1 DUBLIN & LOTKA, THE MONEY VALUE OF A MAN 106 (Rev. ed. 1946);
McBRma, DxSABIITY EVALUATION (5th ed. 1953).
3 2 The physician who treated plaintiff has been allowed to testify as an
expert that the fee he charged is reasonable. Lange v. Kansas City So. Ry. Co.,
290 P. 2d 71 (Mo. 1956). See generally McCoRMicK, DAMAGES 323-7 (1953). Of
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This requirement that the charge be "reasonable" is a powerful weapon
in the hands of a court which thinks a verdict is too large. In a case
recently tried by the senior author, the evidence showed that plaintiff,
completely paralyzed from the waist down, would require the services
of a daily attendant. Plaintiff called a doctor, familiar with the area
where plaintiff lived, who testified that the reasonable cost of an attendant
for plaintiff would be $10 per day. There was no other testimony on
this subject. But the appellate court held the jury was mistaken in
awarding recovery for this element of damages on the basis of $10 per
day.
* * *[W]e think it is unrealistic to predicate the assessment
of plaintiff's damage therefor exclusively on the cost of an
attendant employed on a day-to-day basis. In view of the type
of non-professional assistance plaintiff will require, it appears
unreasonable to us to claim that he cannot obtain the services
of a competent daytime attendant in Thief River Falls for an
average sum less than $304.16 per month for the estimated
balance of his lifetime.3
A major element of recovery in a FELA injuries action is an allow-
ance for future pain, suffering and disability. It has long been clear
that the plaintiff is entitled to such recovery.34  But quite recently, as
the sums awarded on this account have become substantial, the propriety
of such damages has been challenged., 5 Professor Jaffe studies the ration-
alizations offered to defend an award for pain and suffering, finds them
unconvincing, and concludes:
Insurance aside, it is doubtful justice seriously to embarrass
a defendant, though negligent, by real economic loss in order
to do honor to plaintiff's experience of pain. And insurance
present, it is doubtful that the pooled social fund of savings
should be charged with sums of indeterminate amount when
compensation performs no specific economic function."6
course by the more common rule, plaintiff can recover the reasonable value of
services gratuitously performed, as by a member of his family. Id. at 324-5.
33 Ahlstrom v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. S. M. R. Co., 244 Minn. 1, 28-9, 68
N. W. 2d 873, 890 (1955).
34 Chesapeake & 0. R. Co. v' Carnahan, 241 U. S. (1916); McCoRMIcK, DAM-
AGEs 315-9 (1935). Several courts have noted that, because of this element of pain
and suffering, it is fallacious to suppose that a verdict is excessive merely because it
equals or exceeds the maximum amount which the jury could properly have
found for lost earnings and medical expenses. Schlatter v. McCarthy, 113 Utah
560, 561, 198 F. 2d 473, 474 (1948) ; Thompson v. Barnes, 236 S. W. 2d 656, 661
(Tex. Civ. App. 1950); Delaney v. New York Cent. R. Co., 68 F. Supp. 70
(S.D.N.Y. 1946).
35 In Loftin v. Wilson, 67 So. 2d 185 Fla. (1953), the verdict of $300,000
included $207,000 for future pain and suffering. The court found this amount
excessive.
3 6Jaffe, Damages for Personal Injury: The Impact of Insurance, 18 L. &
CONTEMP. PROB. 219, 225 (1953).
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And Professor Bauer, though less philosophical, paints a graphic picture
of the dangers which awards for pain and suffering may present:
Nowhere is it easier for a skillful lawyer for the plaintiff to lead
a jury into wild and fanciful and emotional commutations
than here, for pain and suffering are among the universally
abhorred experiences of mankind, and the average juror can
easily have his already great and proper sympathy with the
plaintiff augmented into a perfect willingness to find a verdict
of almost astronomical proportions if the court does not control
the jury by means of the necessary and proper instructions.3 7
Just what these necessary and proper instructions are to be is never made
clear. The emptiness of verbal formulae in this area is well illustrated
by a Florida case in which a verdict of $300,000, of which $207,000
was said to be an allowance for pain and suffering, was set aside as
having been governed by "sentimental or fanciful standards." The court
undertook to lay down the proper test:
The award for pain and suffering must be limited to compen-
sation. * --' * Compensation in this connection is to be under-
stood as describing an allowance looking toward recompense
for, or made because of, the suffering consequent upon the
injury. 38
What would a jury so instructed know that it did not know befor'e?
The justification for pain and suffering awards can be illustrated
by the facts of a recent common law case in Connecticut. A 36 year
old man was injured through the negligence of the defendant. The injury
quickly healed-to the extent that it ever would--and thus there was
no claim for future medical expenses or loss of earnings. But the con-
sequences of the injury were such that the plaintiff would have a 35%
to 45 1 loss of use of one arm, and would suffer pain, for the rest of
his life. He was awarded $44,000, reduced by the appellate court to
$32,000."9 Would Professor Jaffe allow no recovery? Certainly the
plaintiff in that case was worse off because of the accident than he had
been before. No one would deny that he has been harmed. Should he
bear that harm himself, or should the erring railroad be required to bear
it? Those who object to allowing damages for pain, suffering and
disability seem to be worried principally by the fact that the defendant
is required to give up something of economic value to compensate for
a non-economic loss. But our society has long passed the day when only
3 7 Bauer, Fundamental Principles of the Lawy of Dam ges in Mediro-Legal
Cases, 19 TENN. L. REv. 255, 270-1 (1946).
3 8 Loftin v. Wilson, 67 So. 2d 185, 189 (Fla. 1953). Compare James, Damages
in .Accident Cases, 41 CORNELL L. Q. 582, 604 (1956): " * * * the language of
compensation has real significance only in framing instructions which are cal-
culated to put the jury in a proper frame of mind to exercise self-restraint, and
in furnishing an appropriate frame of reference for supervisory action by the
court in cutting down verdicts felt to be excessive."
30 Gorczyea v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 141 Conn. 701, 109 A. 2d 589
(1954).
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economic values were thought real and only property interests entitled
to judicial protection. Our concern for the dignity of the individual has
led us to recognize that his rights of personality are fully as important
as are property rights.4" If these rights of personality are injured, plaintiff
is the poorer. As between an innocent plaintiff and a negligent defendant,
it is not difficult to decide who should bear this loss.
The same reasoning which supports recovery for pain and suffering
permits recovery also, where the injury has caused scars, mutilation, or
disfigurement, for embarrassment and humiliation.4 Take, for example,
the case of the brakeman who lost an arm. When computing an allow-
ance for pain and suffering, the jury will consider, if established, symp-
toms of a "phantom limb" with its resulting burning sensation and pain.
For embarrassment and humiliation they will look to quite a different
set of experiences: people staring at plaintiff on the street; people stopping
him and asking questions; the need for someone to help him with his
food in a restaurant; the inquiries of his children as to why he cannot
play with them as any other father plays with children. A money recovery
will not end these unpleasant experiences. It will provide plaintiff with
the means to indulge in other pleasures which may help to make up for
his embarrassment and humiliation.
Of course there is no precise mathematical rule by which the dam-
ages for pain, suffering and disability, or for embarrassment and humilia-
tion, can be measured. Medical testimony can show the reality and the
permanence of the pain, but we believe that lay testimony is even more
valuable. The plaintiff himself can give very helpful testimony in a
genuine and legitimate case of pain and suffering, and the testimony of
nurses, co-employees, or others who have cared for or observed the plain-
tiff, will be useful.41" Despite the availability of such testimony, courts
show a distressing willingness to evaluate the pain and suffering on the
basis of a cold printed record. The Minnesota Supreme Court, relying
presumably on judicial notice, has announced that suffering "will vary
and generally decrease as time goes on," and that embarrassment and
humiliation "should greatly decrease as time passes." '  Apparently a
different rule applies as people grow older. The Ninth Circuit, in a case
involving a 5 9 year old man, said:
40 For a criticism of the extent to which the equity courts have gone in this
direction, see Wright, The Law of Remedies as a Social Institution, 18 U. of DET.
L. 3. 376, 382-6 (1955). For recognition of a right to recover damages for "loss or
impairment of power and capacity of work and mobility, which is the right to
be a normal human being," see note 97 infra.
4 1 E.g., Erie R. Co. v. Collins, 253 U. S. 77 (1920) ; McCoRMIcK, DAMAGES 317
(1935); and authorities cited at DeParcq, Evaluation for Settlement or Trial,
24 TENN. L. RaV. 172, 176, n. 10 (1956).
41a For, good examples of the kind of helpful testimony of this sort that a
nurse can give, see Smith v. Wichita Transp. Corp., 179 Kan. 8, 293 P. 2d 242, 249
(1956); Mathis v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 300 P. 2d 482 (N. Mex. 1956).
42 Ahlstrom v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S.S.M. R. Co., 244 Minn. 1, 30, 68 N.W.
2d 873, 891 (1955).
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It is common knowledge that for a man of Guthrie's age, aches
and pains arising out of physical disabilities do not ordinarily
lessen, as they might for a younger man.
43
In an effort to provide some guidance to the jury in the evaluation
of these non-economic elements of damages, it has recently been usual
for plaintiffs' lawyers to suggest, in argument to the jury, a modern sum
per day which might be appropriate compensation. Thus $10,000 sounds
like, and is, a very large sum of money-but the jury may see it in a dif-
ferent light when it realizes that this is less than $1 per day for a man
with an expectancy of 30 years.
If this technique is used moderately and responsibly, it would seem
to be a help to the jury rather than otherwise. And indeed the earliest
reported case to comment on the technique found it unobjectionable, say-
ing that it falls within the rule that counsel in argument to the jury may
suggest and state what be believes the evidence shows in the way of a
damage award.44
In a recent case, tried without a jury, the court awarded $20,400
for pain and suffering of a 62 year old man, calculated as follows: $100
a day for the first month; $50 a day for the second month; $20 a day
for the next four months; and $100 a month for the balance of his
life. 4 " The Sixth Circuit affirmed the award, saying:
We are more concerned with the result, reached by a reason-
able process of reasoning and consistent with the evidence, than
we are with which one of several suitable formulas was actually
used by the juror or judge. It is not necessary for us to adopt
the method used by the District Judge as a rule of law for the
proper disposition of such an issue, and we do not do so. In
our opinion, it was not an arbitrary and unreasonable approach
to the problem presented and its application was so adjusted in
the present case as to be consistent with the evidence and to
reach a result which does not appear to us to be manifestly
unjust.44b
A few recent cases have pointed in an opposite direction. Although
no court has yet held it is erroneous, or prejudicial misconduct, for coun-
sel to make an argument to the jury of the sort suggested, verdicts
which have been reached on the basis of such arguments have been re-
43 Southern Pac. Co. v. Guthrie, 180 F. 2d 295, 303 (9th Cir. 1949).
44J. D. Wright & Son Truck Line v. Chandler, 231 S.W. 2d 786, 789
(Tex. Civ. App. 1950). A corollary technique which many lawyers think helpful
to the jury is use of a blackboard for purposes of illustration during the examina-
tion of a witness or during the summation. 1 BELLI MODERN TRiAns §§ 128 el seq.
(1954). The Second Circuit has said that this technique "would seem often poten-
tially useful, as tending to clarify the issues." But it went on to say that it is in
the discretion of the trial judge whether to permit its use. Mirabile v. New York
Central R. Co., 230 F. 2d 498, 500 (2d Cir. 1956).
448. Drlik v. Imperial Oil Ltd., 141 F. Supp. 388, 394 (N. D. Ohio 1955).
44b. Imperial Oil, Ltd. v. Drlik, 234 P. 2d 4, 11 (6th Cir. 1956).
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duced or set aside, with sharp criticism of this technique of argument.
One such case is Ahlstrom v. Minneapolis, St.P. & S.S.M. R. Go.,45
in which the senior author represented plaintiff. The facts were well
stated by the court:
The physical condition of plaintiff is doubtless very serious. Here
we have a young man, 26 years of age at the time of trial,
who has complete motor and sensory paralysis of the lower half
of his body downward from a line just below the navel. His
condition is such that he will be confined to a wheel chair for
the rest of his life since he cannot use braces or crutches ef-
fectively, and, viewing the evidence thereon in the light most
favorable to the verdict, he will need the services of a daytime
attendant for the remainder of his life. Plaintiff has no control
over his bladder and bowels and will be subject to public
embarrassment and humiliation therefrom. Also, he has no
prospect of a normal married life since he has lost all sexual
powers. There is no hope for either natural or surgical improve-
ment of his condition during the estimated 40.75 years remain-
ing of his life.46
In closing argument it was suggested to the jury that $5 a day for pain,
suffering, disability, embarrassment and humiliation might be an appro-
priate figure, and that this would amount to $91,670 for the plaintiff's
life expectancy. This and the other elements of damage suggested to
the jury totalled $295,589.05. The jury awarded $275,000, and the
trial court denied a motion for a new trial on the ground of excessive
damages.
The Minnesota Supreme Court was critical of the suggested award
for pain and suffering.
An award for pain, suffering, and disability on a per diem basis
ignores the subjective basis of such damages. Unlike loss of
earnings or the cost of a medical attendant, pain, suffering, and
disability recoveries cannot be reduced to mathematical for-
mulae, and on this theory they have been exempted from deduc-
tions for present worth. Each day of suffering is a part of a
whole and will vary and generally decrease as time goes on.
To permit a per diem evaluation of pain, suffering, and disability
would plunge the already subjective determination into absurdity
by demanding accurate mathematical computation of the present
worth of an amount reached by guesswork. This is especially
true in plaintiff's case where his loss of sensory perception will
limit his pain and suffering to mental reactions of embarrass-
ment, humiliation, and frustration based upon his personality
traits and which should greatly decrease as time passes. Cer-
tainly no amount of money per day could compensate a person
reduced to plaintiff's position, and to attempt such evaluation,
as in this case, leads only to monstrous verdicts. In view of the
4 244 Minn. 1, 68 N.W. 2d 873 (1955).
46 Id. at 24, 68 N.W. 2d at 887-8.
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other elements of damage, it is apparent that the jury awarded
plaintiff something over $70,000 for pain, suffering, and dis-
ability. It is our opinion that such an award for this element
of damage is not justified by the evidence presented in the instant
case.
4 7
The court, critical also of some of the other findings of the jury
as to damages, ordered a remittitur of $100,000.
The same court, one week later, spoke out once more against this
type of argument. In reducing a verdict, principally for the loss of an
arm at the shoulder and a claimed back injury, from $170,000 to
$105,000 the court said that the segmentation process of calculating dam-
ages on the basis of a fixed rate per day
though illuminating, may be misleading. * Furthermore,
pain and suffering which is subjective and which at its very
worst usually varies from day to day cannot, with any finality,
be estimated on a daily basis.
48
The Federal District Court for Minnesota has had its say to the same
effect.49 And the Florida Supreme Court has hinted at possible doubts
as to the propriety of this method of arguing. In a case in which it upheld
an award of $187,000 for loss of a leg, the court noted that the jury
had allowed precisely $5 per day for pain and suffering, as suggested by
plaintiff's counsel. The court said that this method of calculating dam-
ages had not been challenged in the trial court, but
if it be considered to be deceptive and to produce an excessive
verdict, the court, in a proper case, and in the exercise of sound
discretion to prevent injustice by excessive verdicts, may so
find and order an appropriate remittitur. °
What is there about this method of argument which may be "mis-
leading" or "deceptive"? Of course no sensible person would contend
that pain or embarrassment are constants, or argue that the amount of
these which Oscar Ahlstrom is going to suffer each day of his life is
worth precisely $5. The usefulness of the per diem technique is as a
reminder to the jury to consider the harmful effects of this accident upon
him, not in terms of such a broad generality as his lifetime, but in terms
of the 18,000 separate days in which he is going to have to sit in a wheel-
chair, in which he is going to require an attendant for the simplest func-
tions, in which he is going to be deprived of the satisfactions he would
have had absent defendant's negligence. Is this "deceptive" or "mis-
leading"?
One of the best descriptions of how these non-economic factors are
to be measured was set out by the Florida court in the case just con-
sidered:
4 71d. at 29-30, 68 N.W. 2d at 891.
4SHallada v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 244 Minn. 81, 98-9, 69 N.W. 2d 673,
687 (1955), cert. denied 350 U. S. 874 (1955).
4 9 Becksted v. Skelly Oil Co., 131 F. Supp. 940, 943 (D. Minn. 1955).
rIOBraddock v. Seaboard Air Line R. Co., 80 So. 2d 662, 668 (Fla. 1955).
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Jurors know the nature of pain, embarrassment and inconven-
ience and they also know the nature of money. Their problem
of equating the two to afford reasonable and just compensation
calls for a high order of human judgment, and the law has
provided no better yardstick for their guidance than their
enlightened conscience. 5
1
In the performance of that difficult task, the jury should be given
all the help possible. We believe that emphasis on the daily aspects of
these consequences of the injury, and a reminder that even seemingly
large sums become quite small when they are divided over a long enough
period, are helpful to juries and should be considered proper.
Death actions
Where the employee is killed, rather than merely maimed, the uni-
form federal rule, which must be followed no matter what the local
wrongful death act provides," is that his administrator, suing for the
benefit of the next of kin, is entitled to recover such damages
as flow from the deprivation of the pecuniary benefits which
the beneficiaries might have reasonably received if the deceased
had not died from his injuries.5 3
These include both the estimated value of the portion of his earnings
which he can reasonably have been expected to give to his family, usually
referred to as "contributions," and certain less tangible items such as care
and training of his children, and services around the home.54. If he
survived the accident for some time before dying, an award for conscious
pain and suffering is also proper.55 No allowance can be made for the
anguish and grief of his relatives,5 6 nor for funeral expenses.
57
Far and away the major element of recovery is the "contributions."
The measure of damages in a FELA death action is said to be based on
Lord Campbell's Act, the English statute which provided a model for
many state wrongful death acts.58 Among the states there is some con-
fusion in construing such statutes. 9 Many states allow recovery of "net
earnings," which is the expected earnings of the deceased less his per-
sonal living expenses. This sum represents both what he would have
given to his family and what he would have accumulated. It is very
51 Ibid.
52 Chesapeake & 0. R. Co. v. Kelly, 241 U. S. 485, 491 (1916).
53 Michigan Cent. R. Co. v. Vreeland, 227 U. S. 59, 70 (1913).
54Id. at 71; Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Holbrook, 235 U. S. 625 (1915).
55 St. Louis, LM. & S. Ry. Co. v. Craft, 237 U. S. 648 (1915).
56Michigan Cent. R. Co. v. Vreeland, 227 U. S. 59 (1913); McCoRticK,
DAMAGES 347-9 (1935).
57Heffner v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 81 F. 2d 28 (2d Cir. 1936); Phila-
delphia & I Ry. Co. v. Maryland, 239 Fed. 1 (3d Cir. 1917), cert. denied 245
U. S. 671 (1918); Parga v. Pacific Electric Ry. Co., 103 Cal. App. 2d 840, 230 P.
2d 364 (1951).
58 See Dow v. Carnegie-Illinois Steel Corp., 165 F. 2d 777, 779 (3d Cir. 1948).
59 McCoRMicx, DAMAGES 339-345 (1935).
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clear that the more restrictive standard of "contributions" applies in a
FELA action, that the next of kin are only entitled to recover for the
pecuniary benefit they have lost, and that
the "benefit" is the amount which the jury finds the dead man
would have given to his wife and other dependents had he
lived.6"
Thus in an early case the Supreme Court held it was error to instruct the
jury that they could compute damages by simply deducting his living
expenses from his expected income.61 The instruction would have allowed
the jury to use the "net earnings" measure.
But while the distinction is an important one in other kinds of cases,
and even in FELA actions care must be used to employ the right formula,
in fact in most such actions the difference is purely verbal. The average
railroad worker for whose death recovery is sought under FELA is a
man of moderate means. He has no excess income to put into savings.
rnstead his contributions to his family are closely related to his earning
capacity. In most railroad households, the paycheck is turned over to the
worker's wife, and she gives him a small allowance for his own living
expenses. The amount given to the wife, less the allowance for the
worker, represents the "contributions."
This has been reflected in many cases. In one case the court de-
scribed the evidence as to "contributions" as follows:
With the exception of deductions under the Railroad Retire-
ment Act of 1937, 45 U.S.C. § 288a et seq., and about $3 per
month for spending, he contributed all of his earnings to his
wife. He expended very little money for clothes and other
living expenses.62
Again another court relied for its computations on evidence that from
his earnings of $2100 a year, decedent
retained for his own personal needs approximately $150 a year
and * * * the balance went into the maintenance of the house-
hold.63
One dead employee was found to have contributed $170 a month, out
of earnings of $210, to his family.64 In another case decedent was
found to have given
all of his earnings to his wife for the support of his family,
consisting of three children, except such sums as were necessary
for his travel expense.6"
In a similar case, where the evidence showed earnings of $4200 a year
60 Dow v. Carnegie-Illinois Steel Corp., 165 F. 2d 777, 779 (3d Cir. 1948).
61 Kansas City Southern Ry. Co. v. Leslie, 238 U. S. 599 (1915).
62 Giles v. Chicago G. NV. Ry. Co., 72 F. Supp. 493, 495 (D. Minn. 1947).
63 Sherman v. Southern Pac. Co., 34 Cal. App. 2d 490, 499. 93 P. 2d 812,
818 (1939).
64 Sibert v. Litchfield & M. Ry. Co., 159 S. NV. 2d 612, 618-9 (Mo. 1941).
65 O'Brien v. Chicago & N. XV. Ry. Co., 329 111. App. 382, 402, 68 N. E.
2d 638, 648 (1946).
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and expenses of $900 to $1000 applicable only to decedent while away
on the road, the railroad itself, in attacking the verdict as excessive,
assumed that contributions could be computed on a basis of $3000 a year.66
Actually it is not only railroad workers who give their wives their
paycheck-as many readers of this Journal may know from experi-
ence. Evidence in an airplane crash case showed that a young man was
making $9000 a year as superintendent of the Easter Egg Coloring De-
partment of a candy factory.
All of the decedent's income, with the exception of $30 a week
which he reserved for his own immediate needs and purposes,
was required and used for the support of his family.6"
The court deducted this $30 a week and the amount of his income taxes
from his earnings, and held that his "contributions" were $6500 a year.
The case just discussed is the only case we have found which even
hints that federal income tax is a factor to be considered in a death
action, and it contains no discussion of the point. There is a square
holding that taxation is not a proper factor in calculating death damages
by the Ohio Court of Appeals68 , and a strong and reasoned argument
to that effect by the Illinois Supreme Court. 9 Certainly the reasons
which have moved many courts to hold that federal taxes should not be
considered in injuries actions7" retain much force in death actions. Tax-
ation is still a matter between the taxpayer and the government, which
should be of no concern to the tortfeasor. And the effect of taxation cannot
readily be predicted by a jury: tax rates changes, and prolific railroad
workers are constantly increasing the number of their exemptions. At
the same time, we recognize that in death cases it can be argued that the
workman could not contribute to his family the sum he pays as tax to the
government.
In the present state of the authorities, to the extent that there is a
rule of law, it is that taxes need not be deducted. Nevertheless, so long
as the question remains at all unsettled, we have preferred in our own
cases to deduct taxes in calculating the amount which we ask the jury
to award .71 It seems to us tactically wise, even if not legally compelled,
to ask for less than we might be entitled to, and give the railroad the
benefit of every doubtful question, in order that we may argue more
6 6 Miller v. Southern Pac. Co., 117 Cal. App. 2d 492, 256 P. 2d 603 (1953),
cert. denied 346 U. S. 909 (1953).
67 DeVito v. United Air Lines, 98 F. Supp. 88, 98 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
68 Smith v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 47 Ohio App. 49, 99 N.E. 2d 501 (1950).
6 9 Hall v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 5 Ill. 2d 135, 125 N.E. 2d 77 (1955),
held applicable to death actions in Allendorf v. Elgin, J. & E. R. Co., 8 Ill. 2d
164, 133 N. E. 2d 288, 296 (1956). Accord: Wawryszyn v. Illinois Cent. R. Co.
10 IIl. App. d 394, 135 N. E. 2d 154 (1956).
70 See pp. 435-6 above.
71 E.g., Starck v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 4 Ill. 2d 611, 123 N.E. 2d 826
(1954); Allendorf v. Elgin J. & E. R. Co., 8 Ill. 2d 164, 133 N. E. 2nd 288, 296
(1956).
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forcefully for the smaller amount to which the widow and children are
certainly entitled. 2
Even though the recoverable damages are thus tied closely to dece-
dent's earnings, something more than proof of earnings is necessary for
a verdict. Where there is no proof as to how much of his earnings he
gave his next of kin, the jury has no basis on which to compute "contribu-
tions," and cannot properly make any award for this important element
of damages.73
There has lately been an attempt by railroad lawyers to attack proof
of contributions based on the amount turned over to the wife. In these
cases the evidence shows, as is usual, that from the amount given her the
wife paid all the household expenses. Suppose the proof is that decedent
gave his wife $300 a month, and that she used this to- maintain a home
for him and for their two children. Defense counsel would argue that
the actual contributions are only $225, since decedent enjoyed one-fourth
of the benefits purchased with the money given his wife.74
No one would deny that defendant is entitled to make such an
argument to the jury. If the jury believes the argument, it could award
three-fourths of the sum testified to by plaintiff's actuary as the present
worth of the expected contributions. Indeed defendant, in cross-examining
the actuary, can prepare for such an argument by asking what the present
worth of $225 a month would be. At the same time, plaintiff has the
right to claim that the entire $300 was a contribution to the family, and
the jury might very well so find. 5 It could rely on its own experience
72 Thus in the Allendorf case, supra, the unduly favorable calculation which
deducted taxes was held by the court to help offset any prejudicial effect which
might otherwise have resulted from the admission of certain other evidence the
court thought erroneous.
73 Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Anderson, 134 Tenn. 666, 185 S.W. 677
(1916); Parga v. Pacific Electric Ry. Co., 103 Cal. App. 2d 840, 230 P. 2d 364
(1951) ; cf. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co. v. Leslie, 238 U. S. 599 (1915). But
r/. Kreitzer v. Southern Pac. Co., 38 Cal. App. 654, 177 Pac. 477 (1918).
74 In Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. McMoy, 261 Ala. 66, 73 So. 2d 85 (1954),
the husband turned over $250 monthly to his wife. The court said that part of this
went for rent, groceries, electricity, etc., and that the husband ate and lived at
home and participated in these contributions. Thus it concluded that $180 a month
"appears reasonable" as the amount actually contributed to the wife. To similar
effect is Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Young's Adm'x, 253 S.W. 2d 585 (Ky. 1952). It
should be noted that neither of these cases contains any discussion of the sound-
ness of such an assumption. And the cases cited at notes 62-67 above are
inferentially to the contrary.
7 The analysis suggested in the text was accepted in a careful opinion
of the Illinois Supreme Court in Allendorf v. Elgin, J. & E. R. Co., 8 I1. 2d 164,
133 N.E. 2d 288 (1956). An earlier opinion in that case, superseded on rehearing,
was even more specific: 'It may well be that Allendorf used the family house
and enjoyed a measure of the family conveniences. We cannot say, however, that
by his so doing, these benefits to other members of the family were proportionately
reduced." See also Wright, A Primer of Practical Evidence, 40 MimN. L. REv.
635, 654-5 (1956).
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as to the truth of the adage that two can live as cheaply as one, and reject
the sophisticated arguments offered by defense counsel. Thus a large
part of the family living expense goes for housing. Decedent did not
provide his wife and children with three-quarters of a house; he provided
them with a house. This house is just as expensive to pay for and main-
tain with the widow sleeping by herself in the master bedroom as it was
when she shared the room with her husband. Suppose, for example, that
the total housing cost before the accident was $100. The railroads would
argue that the dependents will be made whole if they are given $75.
Justice Holmes has reminded us that "judges need not be more naive
than other men." Neither do jurors.
We showed earlier that in a suit for injuries the jury may consider
the possibility that plaintiff's earnings would have increased, and may
award damages for impairment of earning capacity based on a figure
larger than the earnings he enjoyed before the accident.70 The same
principle applies in a death action. The jury may decide that a young
man's earnings would have increased and that his contributions would
have risen proportionately.7 7 In making this evaluation of the decedent's
prospects at the time of his death, the jury may give weight to such specific
factors as that he had already been classified as an engineer by the rail-
road company, though still working as a fireman,78 or that a seaman "was
ambitious to improve his status and increase his annual earnings" and was
already taking steps toward becoming a licensed officer.79
The Supreme Court ruled in an early leading case that the pecuniary
loss to the next of kin does not turn on any legal liability of the decedent
to support 'them; they must show "some reasonable expectation of pe-
cuniary assistance or support."8 " This necessarily gives relevance to the
degree of domestic bliss which prevailed in the home now rent by death.
Defendant can introduce evidence that husband and wife had separated
prior to his death and had not been reconciled; such evidence does not
76 See pp. 433-5 above.
77 1* * (T)hey could have based their award on other factors, such as
the prospect that the son would make increased contributions in the future from
larger earnings and the decreased purchasing power of the dollar." Renaldi v. New
York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 230 F. 2d 841, 845 (2d Cir. 1956). "Competent statistical
data supports a common sense observation that a man so young with so large an
income is likely to continue to advance and to enjoy a substantially greater income
in the future. See Fig. 4 in DUBLIN & LOTKA, THE MONEY VALUE OF A MAN, 65
(Rev. ed. 1946)." Allendorf v. Elgin, J. & E. R. Co., 8 I1. 2d 164, 133 N.E. 2d
288, 296 (1956).
Accord: Beattie v. Monongahela R. Co., 122 F. Supp. 803 (NV. D. Pa. 1954);
McKee v. Jamestown Baking Co., 101 F. Supp. 794, 796 (W.D. Pa. 1952). But
of. DeVito v. United Air Lines, 98 F. Supp. 88 (E. D. N. Y. 1951).
78 O'Brien v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 329 Ill. App. 382, 68 N. E. 2d 638
(1946).
79 Naylor v. Isthmian S. S. Co., 94 F. Supp. 422, 424 (S.D.N.Y. 1950),
re'd on other grounds, 187 F. 2d 538 (2d Cir. 1951).
80 Michigan Cent. R. Co. v. Vreeland, 227 U. S. 59, 70 (1913).
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defeat recovery but leaves it for the jury to decide how much decedent
would have been likely to have contributed to his spouse."s In one recent
case the widow had been deserted by her husband nearly 20 years before,
she had neither seen him nor received any support from him in the interim,
and he had "remarried" and had five children in the interval by his
putative wife. An award to the widow of $4500 for contributions and
$500 for decedent's conscious pain and suffering was affirmed."
Evidence of domestic unhappiness which is too remote, and likely
to be merely prejudicial, will not be received. Thus it is safe to surmise
that defendant would not be allowed to introduce evidence that husband
and wife had frequent loud fights, or that he was frequently seen with
another woman, so long as decedent was still living with his wife and
supporting her at the time of his death. And admission of evidence that
the wife had gotten a judicial separation, and the husband had sued un-
successfully for divorce, three years before was held to be reversible error
where the wife had returned to her husband and the two had lived
happily for the seven months prior to his death. The court said:
To hold that an unsuccessful action for absolute divorce, begun
and terminated several years before a complete reconciliation of
a husband and a wife, would serve to demonstrate a disposi-
tion on the part of the husband to withhold funds which he
might otherwise have given his wife if he had lived is to put
speculation on speculation, effecting a mere chimera of evi-
dence.83
What the widow does after the death is her own business, not de-
fendant's. If she chooses to find solace for her grief on the shoulder of
another man, this is her privilege, and her damages are not diminished
thereby. She had a reasonable expectation of support from her first hus-
band at the time of his death, and is entitled to recover for the destruc-
tion of that expectation, even though she later finds someone else to sup-
port her . Plaintiff is entitled to an instruction that the jury is not to
consider the widow's remarriage; 8 4 one wonders, indeed, if evidence of
the remarriage should not be excluded as irrelevant.
Suppose that the verdict is larger than the highest amount which the
jury could properly have found as the present worth of the expected
contributions. Is the Verdict then excessive? Clearly the answer must
normally be "No."
This has been strikingly illustrated by the United States Supreme
Court in its most recent decision as to damages under FELA.
81 McGlethan v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 170 F. 2d 121 (3d Cir. 1949).
2 Civil v. Waterman S. S. Corp., 217 F. 2d 94 (2d Cir. 1954), criticized
Comm., The Deserted Wife's Loss from the Death of Her Husband, 7 STAN,. L. REV.
409 (1955).
83 Dow v. Carnegie-Illinois Steel Corp., 165 F. 2d 777, 780 (3d Cir. 1948).
84 Sivert v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 197 F. 2d 371 (7th Cir. 1952) ; Baltimore
Transit Co. v. State for Use of Castranda, 194 Md. 421, 71 A. 2d 442 (1950)
(non-FELA case); Anno., 30 A.L.R. 121.
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Suit was brought against the Southern Railway for the death of one
Neese, an unmarried 22 year old man whose average take-home pay had
been $2200. Neese had lived at home with his parents, and had given
them part, but a good deal less than all, of his earnings. The jbry
awarded $60,000, and the trial court required a remittitur of $10,000.
On defendant's appeal from the judgment for $50,000, the Court of
Appeals held that the amount was so excessive as to be "monstrous" and
ordered a new trial as to damages."5 The court pointed out that even
on what it termed the "fantastic" assumption that Neese would have
given his parents $2500 a year for the rest of their lives, the present
worth of this sum would be only $39,000, substantially less than the
judgment in their favor.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in order to decide whether
an appellate court has the power to review verdicts on the ground that
they are excessive, hut it disposed of the case without reaching the ques-
tion of power.
* * *[A]s we view the evidence we think that the action of the
trial court was not without support in the record, and accord-
ingly that its action should not have been disturbed by the Court
of Appeals. 6
It would be hard to find more convincing proof that death damages
cannot be totted up on an adding machine, and that the jury is free to
weigh imponderables in arriving at its verdict.
The same point is illustrated by a state court case, where a verdict
of $80,000 was held not excessive even on the assumption that $60,000
covered the contributions and the pain and suffering for the 20 minutes
decedent lived after his injuries. The court said that the other $20,000
could easily be accounted for as the jury's award to decedent's children
to compensate them for the loss of the care and guidance of a father.
The difference, $20,000, readily could be accounted for as
the award to Miller's children for the loss of their father's care,
attention, instruction, training advice and guidance; not an
excessive amount for four children ranging from 6 to 12 years,
bereft of a father who loved them, took a tender interest in
them, and possessed the personal qualifications this father ex-
hibited, to lead and guide them throughout the years of their
development into the full flower of manhood and womanhood.8"
This element of recovery was authorized by an early Supreme Court
decision.8" It is only proper, however, where there is testimony concern-
85 Southern Ry. v. Neese, 216 F. 2d 772 (4th Cir. 1954)
86 Neese v. Southern Ry. Co., 350 U. S. 77 (1955).
8 7Miller v. Southern Pac. Co., 117 Cal. App. 2d 492, 510, 256 P. 2d 603, 613
(1953), cert. denied 346 U. S. 909 (1953).
88 Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Holbrook, 235 U. S. 625 (1915). A bubstantial
verdict in a non-FELA case was affirmed in Dahl v. North American Creameries,
61 N.W. 2d 916, 925 (N. D. 1953), with the following statement: "The plaintiff
had a right to expect from her father not only support by the way of nurture,
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ing the personal qualities of the deceased and the interest which he took
in his family."' Such testimony is not hard to come by. Witnesses can be
counted upon to rely on the maxim, de mortuis nil nisi bonum. But the
testimony must not be overlooked in the press of more sharply contested
issues. A few sentences from the widow about what a fine person her
husband was, and how his greatest joy in life was to come home from
the switchyard and help his children with their problems, can justify a
good many thousands of dollars in the verdict. It is not necessary to
prove any particular dollars-and-cents value for the lost care and guidance,
any more than it would be necessary to prove the value of pain and
suffering or of inconvenience and annoyance when these are elements
of damages. The jury should assess the value of such loss in the exercise
of its best judgment based on the facts of the particular case. 0
A second intangible element for which recovery can be had is
services which the deceased husband would have performed about the
home." Again there must be evidence that such services were performed
in the past in order to justify an instruction that the jury should consider
the value of such services.9 2 Did the husband cut the grass, put up the
storm windows, or help with the marketing? Did he have a garden in
which he grew food for the family table? Services such as these have a
pecuniary value, as the widow will find when she has to pay someone
to do them for her." She should be asked about such services, and the
jury instructed to consider them in its award.
In the last few years there has been some suggestion 4 that American
jurisdictions, following the English example,9 5 should allow damages
for destruction of the decedent's psychic interest in the continuation of
his own life. We view this proposal with considerable skepticism. The
English experience with such an element of recovery has been less than
clothes and housing but also the care and protection of a father. She is deprived of
that. These are services that cannot be supplied as well by anyone other than the
father. Every young girl now has the right to expect her father to provide her
special training along whatever line of work she plans to enter. All these services
are certainly of pecuniary value to a growing child. The presumption is that the
plaintiff would have those valuable services from her father during her growth
and development and even after that as she might need them during her life
expectancy."
9 OThus in the absence of such testimony, no recovery was allowed for this
element in Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Young's Adm'x, 253 S. V. 2d 585, 589
(Ky. 1952).
00Mobile & 0. R. Co. v. Williams, 226 Ala. 541, 147 So. 819 (1933), cert.
denied 290 U. S. 655 (1933).
91 E.g., Alabama G. S. R. Co. v. Cornett, 214 Ala. 23, 106 So. 242 (1925).
9 2 Michigan Cent. R. Co. v. Vreeland, 227 U. S. 39 (1913).
03 Ward v. Denver & 1- G. V. R. Co., 96 Utah 564, 591, 85 P. 2d 837,
849 (1939).
94E.g., Smith, Psychic Interest in Continuation of One's own Life: Legal
Recognition and Protection, 98 U. OF PA. L. Rav. 781 (1950).
9 5 The leading case is Flint v. Lovell, [1935] 1 K. B, 354 (C.A.),
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happy-go We agree that the decedent has been harmed in this respect,
but fail to see any compelling reason for giving his next of kin a windfall
to compensate for such a uniquely personal loss to the decedent. This is
a far different matter from the award for future pain and suffering to
an injured person, where the plaintiff receives money as compensation
for a non-economic loss which he himself will experience. And the
insistence that only pecuniary losses are compensable in a FELA death
action makes it highly unlikely that recovery for destruction of the psychic
interest in the continuation of one's own life will be held permissible in
this kind of litigationY
The only exception to the restriction of FELA death actions to
pecuniary losses is the specific statutory provision allowing damages for
conscious pain and suffering between the injury and death. 8 It is proper
to sue in one action for the benefits lost to the next of kin, under the
wrongful death section of the statute, and for the conscious pain and
suffering, under the survival section.99 It is not necessary that the jury
segregate the sums allowed under the two sections,' 00 though frequently
such a segregation is made. In the federal courts and most, if not all
states, defendant can request that special interrogatories be submitted to
the jury asking how much is being allowed for pain and suffering and
how much is being allowed for the loss of the next of kin.' It is dis-
cretionary with the trial court, in most jurisdictions, whether to allow such
special interrogatories. Plaintiffs seldom would have any desire for
such special interrogatories. The award for pain and suffering is meas-
ured by no fixed standard, and the jury has a wide range in which to set
the amount. Thus in one case, involving the death of a young seaman,
the jury allowed $75,000 for the death and $40,000 for conscious pain
96 See e.g., the speeches in Bonham v. Gambling, [1941] A.C. 157. Indeed Dr.
Smith's thoughtful and provocative article, note 94 supra, comes near to conceding
as much, at pp. 823-4.
97It has been twice rejected by the Third Circuit. Hickman v. Taylor, 170
F. 2d 327 (3d Cir. 1948), cert. denied 336 U. S. 906 (1949) ; Holliday v. Pacific
Atlantic S. S. Co., 212 F. 2d 206 (3d Cir. 1954). We note, however, recent
judicial recognition of a kind of damages which springs from the same philo-
sophic source as the psychic interest in the continuation of one's life. In Fox
v. Fox, 296 P. 2d 252 (Wyo. 1956), a common law injuries action, the court
held that a married woman, without any earnings, might nevertheless recover a
substantial amount for "loss or impairment of power and capacity of work and
mobility, which is the right to be a normal human being." Id. at 262. The court
was at pains to say that this was separate and distinct from any right to recover
for impairment of earning capacity.
9845 U.S.C. §59.
99 St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Craft, 237 U. S. 64S (1915) ($5000 for 30
minutes suffering affirmed).
10OKansas City Southern Ry. Co. v. Leslie, 238 U. S. 599 (1915).
101 E.g., Fed. R.C.P. 49. Cf. Central Vt. R. Co. v. White, 238 U. S. 507,
515 (1915).
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and suffering during the ten hours the seaman survived his injuries. The
trial court refused to set this aside as excessive:
I can find neither intemperance, passion, partiality, nor cor-
ruption on the part of the jury. It worked earnestly and
intently on the case. It had the right to consider the present
purchasing power of the dollar. It had no yardstick, save its
own collective conscience. * * * The pain inflicted on an indi-
vidual which is caused by the wrongdoing of another is no
less to a poor man than to a millionaire. It is most difficult
to assess. In the absence of intemperance, passion, partiality, or
corruption-and there is none evident in this case-I am not
one to say that terrific pain inflicted on a seaman for ten hours
is not worth $40,000-when a jury of free men and women
calmly, carefully and deliberately so decide.10
2
When the damages for conscious pain and suffering are lumped with
the damages for death, the flexibility necessarily present in the former
makes it much harder for a court to determine that the total amount is
improper. And this can sometimes work the other way also. In one
case in which the senior author represented the plaintiff, the jury awarded
$65,000 for death and $35,000 for four day's pain and suffering. A
verdict of $100,000 for both elements of recovery would have been
well justified under the evidence. But the trial court decided that
$35,000 was too much for pain and suffering, and required a remittitur
of $15,000 of this amount.
II. PERIOD OF Loss
The basic amount of loss in a FELA action is calculated in the
manner we have indicated above. It is also necessary for the jury to
determine the period over which this loss will be suffered and for which
damages are recoverable.
Damages in a death action are awarded for the number of years
the next of kin could reasonably have expected to receive benefits from
the deceased. This normally will be the period the deceased probably
would have lived," °3 or the period the beneficiaries themselves can reason-
ably expect to live, whichever is shorter.' The one limitation on this
rule is that minor children are normally able to expect support only
during the period of their minority, and defendant is entitled to an
instruction that damages awarded for loss of benefits of minor children
are to be so limited. 10 5
102 Naylor v. Isthmian S. S. Co., 94 F. Supp. 422, 424 (S. D. N. Y. 1950),
rev'd on other grounds, 187 F. 2d 538 (2d Cir. 1951). Consider also New York
N. H. & H. R. Co. v. Zermani, 200 F. 2d 240 (1st Cir. 1952), cert. denied 345 U. S.
917 (1953), affirming an award of $116,500 for the death of a 39 year old
brakeman, and an additional $25,000 for six days suffering before he died.
103MCCORMicK, DAMAGES 346 (1935).
104 E.g., Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. McMoy, 261 Ala. 66, 73 So. 2d 85
(1954).
105 Thompson v. Camp, 163 F. 2d 396 (6th Cir. 1947), cert. denied 333 U. S.
831 (1948) ; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Kelley, 74 F. 2d 80 (8th Cir. 1934). This
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Suppose that the employee, with an expectancy of 10 years, had
been giving $300 a month for the support of his wife and a 20 year old
child. Should the jury award the present worth of $300 for ten years?
Or should it, as defendants have recently been contending,"'8 assume
that a part of the contributions would cease in a year, when the child
turned 21, and thus award perhaps $200 a month for ten years, and
$100 a month for one year? There are no clear-cut decisions on the
point. We believe that it is for the jury to decide what the decedent
would probably have done with the extra $100 a month when his child
became of age. If the jury believes that the amount would then have
gone into savings, or would have been spent by the employee on himself,
it should limit the recovery in the manner suggested. But if the jury
determines that, as in most households, the wife would continue to take
the entire paycheck and spend more on herself, it should allow recovery
for the full amount. No evidence can show what will happen in a
contingency which has not yet come to pass. The jury's common sense
must provide the rule, guided by a careful instruction that recovery for
support of children is to be limited to their minority.
In an injuries case, damages for impairment of earning capacity
are measured by the length of time the injured person would have lived
had he not been injured, while damages for future medical expenses,
and for pain and the other non-economic elements of recovery, should
be based on the period the plaintiff can expect to live in his injured
conditionlOT
The recovery in all cases is for the destruction of reasonable expec-
tations as of the day of trial, rather than for actual loss. Thus a jury
may award damages to an injured plaintiff on the assumption that he will
live 40 years. If he drops dead the next day, the verdict will stand.108
By the same token in a death action where the widow is the sole bene-
ficiary, her death immediately after trial will not vitiate a verdict based
on a longer expectation as to her life. But as to events which happen
before the trial, the jury must rely on certainties, rather than possibilities.
The Supreme Court has held that the death of the sole beneficiary before
trial does not bar recovery, but damages are to be for the period from the
death of the employee until the death of the beneficiary, and not for
rule is recognized, but omission of a specific instruction to this effect found not to
be prejudicial error, in O'Donnell v. Elgin, J. & E. Ry. Co., 193 F. 2d 348, 355
(7th Cir. 1951), cert. denied 343 U. S. 956 (1952), and Horton v. Seaboard Air
Line Ry. Co., 175 N. C. 472, 95 S. E. 883 (1918), cert. denied 251 U. S. 566 (1919).
106 E.g., Miller v. Southern Pac. Co., 117 Cal. App. 2d 492, 256 P. 2d 603
(1953), cert. denied 346 U. S. 909 (1953).
107 Borcherding v. Eklund, 156 Neb. 196, 55 N. W. 2d 643 (1952);
McCo. mcK, DAMAGES 303-4 (1935). But cf. Comment, The Measure of Damages
for a Shortened Life, 22 U. or Cmr. L. REv. 505 (1955).
108 Dempsey v. Thompson, 363 Mo. 339, 251 S.W. 2d 42 (1952); Rouse V.
New York, C. & St. L. R. Co., 349 Ill. App. 139, 110 N. E. 2d 266 (1953).
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any period thereafter."°9 Thus presumably if an injured plaintiff died
before trial from a cause not connected with the injury, damages would
be limited to his actual lifetime."
0
There has lately been some suggestion that damages for destruction
of the economic value of a man,-whether by way of impairment of
earning capacity in an injuries suit or for loss of contributions in a death
action, should be permitted only for his "work expectancy" rather than
for his "life expectancy." The earning power of many people does
diminish over the years, and this is surely a factor which a jury can and
should take into account."' As one court put it, they should make
due allowance * * * for the decline of earning power because
of the abatement of mental and physical vigor consequent upon
the passage of time."
2
The approach just indicated puts this matter in its proper light, as a part
of the problem of valuing the earning capacity which has been impaired,
rather than as relevant to the period for which recovery should be
calculated. Defendants have sought more; they have asked for instruc-
tions limiting recovery to "work expectancy" and have challenged the
admission of actuarial testimony based on the full life expectancy. Analyti-
cally this is surely unsound. Plaintiff's right is to recover for his impaired
earning capacity for all of his life, though in his last years this capacity
may be very small and should be so valued. Nor does the fact that in
today's society welfare funds and social security have made it possible
for many people to retire while still vigorous diminish recovery. An
unemployed man has an earning capacity entitled to protection. So does
the man who has voluntarily retired." 3
No case has accepted this proposed limitation to "work expectancy."
The only decision even approaching it is one in which the court, in measur-
ing the verdict for excessiveness, said:
There is also controversy as to whether loss of earnings can
be said to relate to a period after Guthrie would have reached
age 70, when the rules of his employer would require his retire-
ment. We think the prospect of a continuance of employment
109Van Beeck v. Sabine Towing Co., 300 U. S. 342, 347 (1937).
II 0 We have found no case on this point. The Pan Beeck case, supra note
109, implies clearly that there could be no recovery for more than the damages
suffered during the actual lifetime. That recovery is possible for this much seems
necessarily to follow from the literal language of 45 U. S. C. §59, which pro-
vides that the claim the injured person would have had survives in the event
of his death.
111 Western & A. R. R. v. Burnett, 79 Ga. App. 530, 541, 54 S. E. 2d 357, 366
(1949); cf. Gill v. United States, 85 F. Supp. 717, 721 (S.D.N.Y. 1949), aff'd
184 F2d 49 (2d Cir. 1950) (case tried to court).
l1 2 Loftin v. Wilson, 67 So. 2d 185, 188 (Fla. 1953).
113 The approach we support, allowing recovery for the full life expectancy
but recognizing that earning capacity may diminish with age, is seemingly adopted
in Imperial Oil, Ltd. v. Drlik, 234 F. 2d 4, 12 (6th Cir. 1956).
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after 70, and after compulsory retirement from employment
by the Southern Pacific, too remote to enter calculation here.
1 1 4
This is certainly far from a holding that recovery must be limited to age
70. It is merely a statement that on the evidence before it the jury
probably found the present worth of the earning capacity after age 70
to be so insignificant as not to justify inclusion. The other cases com-
monly cited in support of "work expectancy" give even less support to
such a doctrine. The "work expectancy" contention was advanced in the
notorious case of Wetherbee v. Elgin, J. & E. Ry. Co.," 5 but neither
commented upon nor adopted by the court. In another case the court
noted that defendant had presented such an argument but put no further
reliance on it."' The only case where a court has seriously discussed
"work expectancy" is a case tried by the senior author, where plaintiff
had voluntarily limited his proof to age 65 rather than for the full
life expectancy. Despite this, defendant argued that "work expectancy"
should be considered. The court said that defendant's contention
rests upon a misunderstanding. Defendant urges that the court
erred in permitting the actuary to calculate expected lost bene-
fits upon the basis of life expectancy rather than work ex-
pectancy. The record conclusively shows that the actuary's
figures were calculated on decedent's retirement at the age of
65.11
As that case indicates, we believe that it is frequently sound, both
ethically and tactically, to ask for less than the maximum the jury might
properly award, rather than to push demands to-and perhaps through
inadvertence beyond-the limit. If the employee probably would have
retired at 65, and his earning capacity thereafter would be insubstantial,
it is far better to confine the proof to age 65, and insist on an award
for the amount which is unquestionably due. 11
8
But where counsel determines to demand damages for the full
expectancy, a multitude of cases support such a choice. The clearest
holding is a case where the injured person had an expectancy of living
until 73, and the actuarial testimony was based on his earning capacity
to that age. The propriety of this testimony was supported by evidence
introduced on behalf of plaintiff that the defendant had in its employ
one engineer 75, one 74, and two well over 65. The appellate court
held it was not error to prove damages to age 73.119
114 S6uthern Pac. Co. v. Guthrie, 180 F. 2d 295, 303 (9th Cir. 1949).
115 191 F. 2d 302, 310-1 (7th Cir. 1951), cert. denied 346 U. S. 867 (1953).
116 Holliday v. Pacific Atlantic S. S. Co., 117 F. Supp. 729, 734 (D. Del. 1953).
117 Starck v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 4 Ill. 2d 611, 624. 123 N. R. 2d
S26, 834 (1954).
118 E.g., Allendorf v. Elgin, J. & E. R. Co., 8 Ill. 2d 164, 133 N. E. 2d 288,
296-7 (1956). Allied Van Lines, Inc. v. Parsons, 80 Ariz. 88, 293 P. 2d 420, 437
(1956) (non-FELA case).
119 Rouse v. New York, C. & St. L. R. Co., 349 Ill. App. 139, 110 N. E. 2d
266 (1953). See also the dictum in Allendorf v. Elgin, J. & E. R. Co., 8 Ill. 2d 164,
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In order to prove the reasonable expectancy of the injured person
or his beneficiaries, it is customary to use mortality tables,' 20 and they
are admissible in a FELA action regardless of any state rule to the con-
trary. 2' Plaintiff will wish to use the latest and most authoritative tables,
and is entitled to do so. The well-known American Experience Table
is based on data almost a century old, and is hardly a reliable guide
today. Even worse is to find courts still using the discredited Carlisle
and Northampton tables, based on inadequate data of English lives at
the beginning of the 19th century.' 22 These bear so little relation to
expectancies of Americans in the last half of the 20th century as to be
completely valueless. The tables which merit admission today are the
Commissioners' Standard Ordinary Table, created from 1941 data and
used for the calculation of insurance premiums, and the even later and
better United States Life Tables, put out by the United States Gov-
ernment.
12 3
Mortality tables are admissible under a well-known exception to the
hearsay rule. 24 Where a foundation seems desirable, it need not be
provided by an actuary; a certified public accountant or other person famil-
133 N.E. 2d 288, 296 (1956): "There are innumerable cases indicating that re-
covery is permissible for the full life expectancy even though the deceased might
have retired at an earlier age. New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad
Co. v. Zermani, 200 F. 2d 240; Fritz v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 185 F. 2d 31;
Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co. v. McMoy, 261 Ala. 66, 73 So. 2d 85; Louisville
& Nashville Railroad Co. v. Young, 253 S.W. 2d 585; Sibert v. Litchfield & M.
Railway Co., 159 S.W. 2d 612, 618. * 5 Furthermore, the actuary's testimony
was based upon future net earnings until the time decedent would have become
65 years of age. According to one mortality table Allendorf's expectancy was
68.21 years. The age of 65 was used because it is the normal age for railroad
retirement. Thus plaintiffs unnecessarily limited their recovery by asking for
computation only until age 65." In addition to the cases cited by the court, see:
Schlatter v. McCarthy, 113 Utah 543, 196 P. 2d 968 (1948), where the verdict
was, to the penny, the exact value of an annuity for the full expectancy of a
61 year old man; Lovejoy v. Monongahela Connecting R. Co., 137 F. Supp. 42,
46 (XV. D. Pa. 1955) (court calculates wage loss for 25 years for 47 year old
man) ; Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Coussens, 77 So. 2d 818, 824 (Miss. 1955) (age
54, expectancy 18.48 years); Miller v. Southern Pac. Co., 117 Cal. App. 2d 492,
256 P. 2d 603 (1953), cert. denied 346 U. S. 909 (1953) (age 37, expectancy 30.35
years).
120 Vicksbrg & M. R. Co. v. Putnam, 118 U. S. 545, (1886).
121 Chesapeake & 0. Ry. Co. v. Kelly, 241 U. S. 485, 491 (1916).
122 See generally Life Tables, 14 ENcy. BRIT. 53 (14th ed. 1939); WRIGHT,
THE CONSTRUCTION AND GRADUATION OF MORTALITY TABLES 3 (1946). The Carlisle
Table has been relied on in, e.g., Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Stephens, 298 Ky. 328,
344, 182 S.W. 2d 447, 456-7 (1944) ; Western & A. R. R. v. Burnett, 79 Ga. App.
530, 544, 5 S. E. 2d 357, 368 (1949).
123The United States Life Table is considered, and held admissible, in
Bennett v. Denver & R.G.W.R. Co., 117 Utah 577, 65-7, 213 P. 2d 325, 329
(1950).
124 McCORIIcK, EVIDENCE 621 (1954).
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
jar with mathematical computations will be sufficient.' 2 Indeed courts
will even take judicial notice of standard tables. 2 Nevertheless the best
procedure is to call an actuary and have him explain the table.
Mortality tables are admissible in every death case. In injury
cases they are admissible only where the injury is such as to indicate
a permanent material impairment of a substantial nature in the earning
capacity of the plaintiff, or permanent pain or disability. 27 The best
course is to precede introduction of the table with medical testimony
that the injury is permanent, but even in the absence of such testimony
the table is admissible if from the injury itself it is a fair inference that
it will be permanent. 2
Mortality tables are not "an unerring guide" to the plriod any
particular individual will live.129 As one court has put it:
Life expectancy is based on the law of averages. It would be
the rare case indeed, we suspect, that any person died on the
date of expiration of his7 calculated expectancy. The expectancy
tables not only take into consideration the known fact that
any person may die prior to his calculated expectancy but also
the known fact that he may live far beyond that period. 30
In order to guard against any tendency in the jury to seize uncritically
the seemingly precise figures of the tables, the jury should be instructed
that they are not conclusive, but are merely to be considered along with
all the other evidence, as to the employee's age, health, habits, and occu-
pation, in determining his probable length of life. 131 There is some
controversy in the cases as to whether one party or the other is required
to tender such an instruction, on pain of having waived his claim that
omission of the instruction was prejudicial error.'82 The controversy
is pointless. It is in the interest of both sides to have the jury properly
instructed on this point, and there is no justification for ever failing to
give the instruction.
The inconclusiveness of mortality tables should still those courts
who calculate the employee's earning capacity for the period shown in
the tables, and order a remittitur if the verdict is substantially in excess
125 Bennett v. Denver & R. G. W. R. Co., 117 Utah 57.65, 213 P. 2d 325,
328 (1950):
126 E.g., Alabama G. S. R. Co. v. Cornett, 214 Ala. 23, 30, 106 So. 242, 249
(1925) ; Hohlstein v. St. Louis Roofing Co., 328 Mo. 899, 42 S.W. 2d 573 (1931).
127 E.g., Schlatter v. McCarthy, 113 Utah 543, 196 P 2d 968 (1948).
128 Thompson v. City of Seattle, 35 Wash. 2d 124, 211 P. 2d 500 (1949).
1 29 See Hallada v. Great Northern Ry., 244 Minn. 81, 95, 69 N.V. 2d 673,
685 (1955), cert. denied 350 U. S. 874 (1955).
130 Dempsey v. Thompson, 363 Mo. 339, 348, 251 S. W. 2d 42, 46 (1952).
131 MCCORMICK, DAMAGES 302-3 (1935). But cf. James v. Chicago, St. P.,
M. & 0. Ry. Co., 218 Minn. 333, 16 N. W. 2d 188 (1944).
182 Compare Avance v. Thompson, 387 Ill. 77, 55 N.E. 2d 57 (1944), cert.
denied 323 U. S. 753 (1944), with Fritz v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 185 F. 2d 31, 36
(7th Cir. 1950).
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of this sum. The correct attitude is illustrated by a federal district judge,
who said, in refusing to find a verdict excessive:
In view of the advanced age of decedents parents, it is most
conceivable that the jury considered the decedent's life ex-
pectancy, and his potential remunerative productivity, in con-
siderable excess of the mean average demonstrated by the
United States Mortality Table.'
33
Recently railroad attorneys have been demanding a more favorable
sort of cautionary instruction than that described above. The point de-
serves to be examined in detail, both because of its superficial attractive-
ness and because of the indefatigable way in which some railroads refuse
to give up on a good thing so long as there is a single jurisdiction that
has not expressly rejected it. We here consider the demands for an
instruction that the hazards of railroading are such that employees will
not live as long as normal people. We believe such an instruction to be
improper for two reasons: 1) it is argumentative, and argument should
come from counsel in his closing rather than from the court in its instruc-
tions; and 2) to the extent that the hazards of railroading do shorten
the expectancy of employees, this loss must be borne by the railroad, not
by the next of kin of the employees.
So far as we can find, several inconspicuous cases in the early '40s
provided the genesis of the present movement. In one the Missouri court,
which is famous for its bizarre approach to damages, said:
Sampson Sibert was fifty-one years of age at the time of his
death. Because he was engaged in a hazardous occupation he
was and should be treated as fifty-four years of age with a
life expectancy of eighteen and nine-tenths years.
1 3 4
A few years later the Kentucky court mentioned in an opinion that the
defendant, the Louisville & Nashville Railroad, had called an insurance
actuary who testified that because of the hazardous employment, the
expectancy of a locomotive fireman should be reduced between four and
five years below normal.' 3 5 But the court did not comment or rule on
this contention. Still later in federal district court in Minnesota a charge
was given that mortality tables are not binding, and that the jury should
consider the hazards of the occupation."3 ' This very mild form of the
charge now sought seems to have provoked no controversy, perhaps be-
cause the verdict was satisfactory to plaintiff.
The key case is Thompson v. Camp, 7 decided by the Sxth Circuit
133 Beattie v. Monongahela R. Co., 122 F. Supp. 803, 806 (W.D.Pa. 1954). And
see Renaldi v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 230 F. 2d 841, 845 (2d Cir. 1956):
"The jury could have concluded that she was in good health and hence that she
would outlive the life expectancy for persons of her age; * 3 ."
1 3 4 Sibert v. Litchfield & M. Ry. Co., 159 S. W. 2d 612, 618 (Mo. 1941).
135 Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Stephens, 298 Ky. 328, 344, 182 S.W. 2d 447, 456
(1944).
136 Giles v. Chicago G. V. Ry. Co., 72 F. Supp. 493 (D. Minn. 1947).
137 163 F. 2d 396 (6th Cir. 1947), cert. denied 333 U. S. 831 (1948).
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in 1947. There the railroad asked that the jury be instructed to consider
decedent's health, that all persons do not live to the age of expectancy,
that such is particularly true in the case of hazardous occupations, that
they may not work during all of the years of their life, that their earnings
may not remain stationary and that the reasonably-to-be-expected con-
tributions may vary or diminish in the future, and that the jury should
not include any amount as contributions which the children would have
received after they attained the age of twenty-one, since it is not pre-
sumed that they would have received any pecuniary benefits from the
deceased thereafter. Failure to give this instruction was held to be prej-
udicial error, and a new trial as to damages was ordered. But it seems
crystal clear from the opinion that the reversal was because recovery
for the children was not limited to their minority. After stating at
length the facts about the children, the court said:
The evidence regarding the amount of the annuity was based
on the assumption that part of his salary was used for the 3upport
of the children. In view of this background, we believe it was
prejudicfal error not to give the requested instruction. The evi-
dence and the lump sum verdict provide no criterion for segre-
gation of the recovery into different parts which would permit
that a remittitur be ordered for the purpose of correcting the
error.
138
Our reading of Thompson v. Camp is supported by the Eighth
Circuit. In 1949 that court, in Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Botts,'
interpreted the earlier case as reversing for failure to limit the children's
recovery to their minority, and affirmed a verdict in a case in which the
"hazardous employment" instruction was requested and denied.
That all persons do not live to the age of normal expectancy,
especially in hazardous occupations, and that they may not work
all their lives, or their earnings may otherwise terminate or
diminish, are such commonplace facts, of daily consciousness,
that they do not need to be made a matter of judicial fiat. If
appellant believed that some reminder of them was necessary,
they clearly were sufficiently emphasizable, for this purpose, in
argument to the jury, as appellant in fact did.' 40
In the same year a Georgia decision agreed that these considerations are
properly for the jury to weigh rather than to be made into a rule of law.141
The matter should have been put to rest by a decision of the Seventh
138 163 F. 2d 396 at 404.
139 173 F. 2d 164, 169 (8th Cir. 1949)
140 Id. at 170.
141 Western & A. R. R. v. Burnett, 79 Ga. App. 530, 54 S.E. 2d 357 (1949).
And in Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. Buckles, 232 F. 2d 257, 262 (5th Cir. 1956), cert.
denied 351 U. S. 984 (1956), it was held not error to refuse to charge-that rail-
roading is a "hazardous occupation."
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Circuit in 195 1,14" where it was very thoroughly considered. Defendant
had requested the following instruction:
You are instructed in estimating the present cash value of any
future loss of earnings, you should also consider the fact that
all persons do not live to the age of expectancy, and this is par-
ticularly true in the case of hazardous occupations such as that
of a railroad switchman; that they may not work during all the
years of their life; that their earnings may not remain station-
ary and that the reasonably to be expected earnings may vary
or diminish in the future. 1 43
The trial court rejected this request, and instead instructed the jury as
follows:
In estimating the present cash value of any future loss of earn-
ings, you may also consider the fact that all persons do not
necessarily live to the age of expectancy and that some persons
live beyond the age of expectancy; that they may not work
during all the years of their life; that their earnings may not
remain stationary and that the reasonably to be expected earnings
may vary and either diminish or increase in the future. 4
The railroad claimed it was error to refuse its requested instruction. The
appellate court rejected this contention.
The instruction as proposed is argumentative and, besides, it
tells the jury only that which every person of good sense knows.
It would be just as informative for the court to instruct the jury
that some people live longer than others, that a person exposed
to danger is not as likely to live as long as one who is not and
that some people retire but of those who do not some may
receive an increase and others a decrease in wages. And we
wonder if it could be possible that any jury would not know
that a railroad switchman is engaged in a hazardous occupation?
The instruction as modified and given is also subject to the
criticism that it is argumentative, but it at least has the virtue
of presenting both sides of the argument. Certainly there was
no error in the giving of this instruction, particularly in view
of that which was requested by the defendant. 145
There the matter should have ended. But one-sided instructions
(whether favoring plaintiffs or defendants) do not even fade away,
much less die. In 1952 the same instruction rejected in the case just
discussed was presented in Kentucky by the tireless Louisville & Nash-
ville Railroad. And the Kentucky Supreme Court, citing Thompson v.
Camp but not mentioning the 7th or 8th Circuit decisions we have here
considered, held that such an instruction should be given. 1 41
142 O'Donnell v. Elgin, J. & E. Ry. Co., 193 F. 2d 348 (7th Cir. 1951), cert.
denied 343 U.S. 956 (1952).
143 193 F. 2d at 354.
144 Ibid.
145 Ibid.
143 Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Young's Adm'x., 253 S. W. 2d 585, 590 (Ky.
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As we indicated at the outset of this discussion, we not only agree
with the distinguished courts which have held the instruction in question
improperly argumentative, but would go further and say it is a false
argument. It is true that railroading is a hazardous business. Although
the incidence of injury is lower in the railroad industry than in manu-
facturing operations, the severity rate is twice as high, and the rate of
fatalities is much higher than in other industries. 4 But is this any reason
for limiting the damages awarded to victims? Suppose that a 30 year
old man, for whom the tables show an expectancy of 35 years, is killed
or permanently injured. Can the railroad be heard to say, "Well, we
would probably have killed him by the time he was 60 in any event, so
he should have only 30 years' damages instead of 35"? The Supreme
Court tells us that every vestige of the doctrine of assumption of risk
has been obliterated by the 1939 amendments to the Act.'4 8 If damages
are to be decreased because the hazards of the industry would have
caught up with the employee sooner or" later, then surely assumption or
risk has come back in by the cellar door.
So far as we can fathom, railroad employees are no more careless
of their own safety than are workers in other industries, pedestrians on
a busy street, or people in their bathtubs. Indeed the railroad employee
is trained to be safety conscious, and thus is probably more careful than
most. Accidents to railroad employees are attributable principally to three
factors: the railroad's failure to furnish a safe place to work; its failure
to adopt or enforce proper rules, customs and practices; and its failure
to furnish safe equipment which functions properly. These omissions by
the railroad, even though they are actually carried out through its em-
ployees, are chargeable to the company by law. A railroad is not entitled
to pay less for its negligence today because it will probably be negligent
tomorrow. The jury should make no deduction because of the hazards of
the occupation.
III. REDUCTION TO PRESENT WORTH4
Calculation of damages would be easy if the amount of loss, de-
termined according to the principles set out earlier, could simply be
multiplied by the period for which such loss is recoverable. Of course
this is not permissible. 4 ' Thanks to the earning power of money, a
dollar in hand received as part of a judgment today is worth considerably
more than a dollar which would be earned forty years from today. Thus
insofar as the verdict is based upon the deprivation of future benefits these
benefits must be discounted by the interest which will be earned on the
money between the time it is paid and the time the benefits would have
147 Richter and Forer, Federal Employers' Liability Act, 12 F. R. D. 13, 48-9
(1952).
1 48 See Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 318 U. S. 54, 58 (1943).
149 Avance v. Thompson, 387 Ill. 77, 84 55 N. E. 2d 57, 60 (1944), cert.
denied 323 U. S. 753 (1944).
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been received."" The usual phrase for this is that the loss must be
reduced to present worth.
This procedure applies only to the compensation for pecuniary losses.
The award for non-pecuniary losses, such as pain and suffering, or
embarrassment and humiliation, need not be discounted.' 51
Calculation of the present value of a monthly income over a period
of years is, as one court has said, "no simple mathematical problem."'
152
Professor McCormick correctly says that "to do this in detail would be
difficult and tedious, and no jury would attempt it, unless one of its
members were an accountant."' 5 3 In practice it is necessary to resort
either to annuity tables, which state the present value of periodic pay-
ments of a given sum for various periods and various interest rates, or
to have expert testimony as to the present value. States may apply their
own rules as to which of these methods of proof to admit, but they are
required, in a FELA action, to allow one or the other.154
No matter whether annuity tables or actuarial testimony is em-
ployed, determination of the present worth requires a decision as to the
rate of interest to be employed in the calculation. The higher the assumed
rate of interest, the smaller the present worth of the required sum, and
thus the smaller the verdict.
It is claimed that most state courts demand that the legal rate of
interest be used in reducing to present worth, a rule which would be
highly favorable to defendants.lss The uniform federal rule, which must
150 Chesapeake & 0. Ry. Co. v. Kelly, 241 U. S. 485 (1916). Where the in-
jured person retains some earning capacity, see pp. 436-7 above, he is entitled to
the present worth of the difference, in each particular year, between the amount
he would have made absent the injury and the amount he can now be expected
to make. Merely to determine the present worth of the expected earnings absent
the injury, and then to deduct from this the gross amount he will actually make
in the future, as suggested in Hallada v. Great Northern Ry., 244 Minn. 81, 96
n. 37, 69 N. V. 2d 673, 685 n. 37 (1955) cert. denied 350 U. S. 874 (1955), would
be to credit the plaintiff with the interest on the proceeds of his retained earning
capacity, even though he does not receive that in advance and thus enjoys no
interest on it.
151 Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. Buckles, 232 F. 2d 257, 264 (Sth Cir. 1956), cert.
denied 352 U. S. (1956); Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. v. Chandler, 283 Fed. 881 (8th
Cir. 1922) ; Braddock v. Seaboard Air Line R. Co., 80 So. 2d 662 (1955) ; Louis-
ville & N. R. Co. v. Bean, 49 Ga. App. 4, 174 S.E. 209 (1934); Louisville & N. R.
Co. v. Gayle, 204 Ky. 142, 263 S.W. 763 (1924) ; Yost v. West Penn. R. Co., 336
Pa. 407, 9 A. 2d 368 (1939) ; see Ahlstrom v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S.S. M. R. Co.,
244 Minn. 1, 29-30, 68 N.V. 2d 873, 891 (1955) ; MCCoRMicK, DAMAGES 318 (1935) ;
Notes, 28 A.L.R. 1177 (1924), 77 A.L.R. 1439, 1451-3 (1932). Contra: Gleason v.
Lowe, 232 Mich. 300, 205 N.V. 199 (1925); Rigley v. Pryor, 290 Mo. 10, 233 S. W.
828 (1921). See Drlik v. Imperial Oil, Ltd., 141 F. Supp. 388, 394 (N.D. Ohio
1955), aff'd 234 F. 2d 4 (6th Cir. 1956).
152 Schlatter v. McCarthy, 113 Utah 543, 556, 196 P. 2d 968, 974-5 (1948).
153 McCo Mic, DAMAGES 304-5 (1935).
154 Chesapeake & 0. Ry. Co. v. Kelly, 241 U. S. 485, 491 (1916).
1 5 6Anno., 105 A.L.R. 234.
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be applied in FELA cases, is to the contrary. In FELA cases the interest
rate used is the highest obtainable on reasonably safe investments made
by persons of ordinary care and prudence in the community where they
live without the exercise of financial experience and skill in the adminis-
tration of the fund. Occasionally a court will undertake to decide
this question for itself. In a 1944 case a banker had testified that the
highest net rate of interest that might be expected from safe and secure
investments was from 2 to 22 7 per year, though he admitted that real
estate loans might bear an average of 43/4%. The appellate court, in
testing the verdict and finding it excessive, assumed a rate of 4%, saying:
We do not think it fair to accept the smaller rate, for it is to
be remembered that we are looking over a period of probably
a quarter of a century, and experience teaches that the present
abnormal condition in the money market will not continue
always. 15
7
In defense of the court it may be said that its crystal ball was no more
clouded than was that of some economists at the time. The court's real
mistake was not realizing that, as a long line of cases has held, the appro-
priate interest rate is a question of fact, to be decided by the jury, and
not a question of law; 158 the same standard must apply to this as to all
other fact questions in FELA cases, that the court must take the view
of the facts most favorable to the verdict, and cannot substitute its judg-
ment for that of the jury if there is any evidence to support the jury's
finding. In the case discussed, the evidence of the banker would have
justified a jury in finding 2% to be an appropriate interest rate, and the
reviewing court must assume that the jury did so find. Since it is a jury
question, evidence should be presented on this as on all other facets of
the case. Normally a banker should be called to give expert testimony
as to obtainable returns on safe investments.1 59
Though some consider annuity tables "not an unmixed blessing,"'
10
there is no difficulty in having them admitted, as an exception to the hear-
say rule.' Actuarial testimony is more likely to be challenged. Oc-
157 Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Stephens, 298 Ky. 328, 344-5, 182 S.W. 2d 447
(1944). And in Virginian Ry. Co. v. Armentrout, 166 F. 2d 400, 407 (4th Cir. 1948),
discussed also p. 468 below, the court rejected as unreasonable a finding below
that 2% was the proper discount rate.
158 Wentz v. T. E. Connolly, Inc. 45 Wash. 2d 127, 138, 273 P. 2d 485, 492
(1954). And see cases cited at Anno., 105 A.L.R. 234, 237-42.
150 E.g., Starck v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 4 Ill. 2d 611, 624, 123 N. E.
2d 826, 833 (1954); cf. Bennett v. Denver & R.G.W. R. Co., 117 Utah 57, 64,
213 P. 2d 325, 328 (1950) (investment counsellor).
100 Schlatter v. McCarthy, 113 Utah 543, 555, 196 P. 2d 968, 974 (1948). But
compare Wolfe, J., concurring at 558, 196 P. 2d at 976: "I feel sure that such
tables usually produce larger verdicts but I am not prepared to say that they
are out of proportion to the injury sustained."
161 Vicksburg & M.R. Co. v. Putnam, 118 U. S. 545, 554 (1886); McCORMICK,
EVIDENCE 621 (1954).
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casionally it may be excluded altogether, 162 but more often the problem
will be as to the kind of testimony the actuary can give. The actuary
is an expert, and his testimony should be limited by the rule which
generally applies to hypothetical questions asked of experts. This rule
is that the hypothetical question can include any facts fairly inferable from
the circumstances proved at the trial. 6 '
It would follow from this rule that the actuary cannot be asked
to testify on the basis of a theory of damages which the jury could not
adopt. Thus in a death action, where as we have seen contributions must
be the measure, it would be error to allow the actuary to testify as to
the present worth of gross earnings, since the jury is not free to calculate
damages on the basis of gross earnings.164 At the same time, it is not
error to admit testimony based on certain assumptions as to the amount
of the contributions even though the evidence would have permitted the
jury to value the contributions at some other amount. 1 5 Instead it should
be proper to ask the actuary the present value on the basis of any assump-
tions as to amount of loss, period of loss, and interest rate which the jury
might permissibly find.
The principle here stated was qualified in a notable redent case in
which we represented the plaintiff.' 6 Evidence had been presented from
which the jury might have found that the next of kin could reasonably
have expected contributions of $378.09 per month from the deceased,
that he had an expectancy of 38 years and 8 months, and that safe invest-
ments by an unskilled person would yield from 2'2 to 3%o. The actuary
testified that the present worth of $378.09 for the period in question at
2Y2% would be $112,904.37, and that at 3% it would be $104,418.69.
Defendant contended on appeal from a verdict of $127,500 that, by the
actuary predicating her ultimate results upon a specific sum and period,
probative value was added to that sum and period, thus invading the
province of the jury. The court said:
To allow an actuary to testify to figures, which the jury might
adopt as real, carries with it the danger that the jury will accept
them not only as the actuary's explanation of his process of
computation but also as proof of contribution and life and work
expectancy. * * *
We are of the opinion that the proper method of assisting a
16 2 E.g., Caldwell v. Southern Pac. Co., 71 F. Supp. 955 (S. D. Cal. 1947).
163 MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE §14 (1954).
164 Wetherbee v. Elgin, J. & E. Ry. Co., 191 F. 2d 302 (7th Cir. 1951),
cert. denied 346 U. S. 867 (1953). Accord: Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. v. Curl, 178
F. 2d 497 (8th Cir. 1949), holding it proper to refuse the railroad's offer of
actuarial testimony as to the present worth of net earnings, after deductions for
income tax and railroad retirement, since these deductions should not be made
by the jury.
165 Southern Pac. Co. v. Klinge, 65 F. 2d 85, 87 (10th Cir. 1933), cert. denicd
290 U. S. 657 (1953).
16 6 Allendorf v. Elgin, J. & E. R. Co., 8 Ill. 2d 164, 133 N.E. 2d 288 (1956).
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jury in making damage calculations is for the actuary to use
neutral figures. In the usual situation where hypothetical in-
quiries are permissible, it is necessary that the expert assume a
factual situation as reflected in the proof in order to insure
that his testimony bears upon the issue to be determined. The
actuary, however, is called upon only to describe to the jury a
mathematical process that will simplify the jury's task of de-
termining the present value of the contribution that plaintiffs
would have received had decedent not been killed. To accomplish
that purpose it is not necessary that he use figures that cor-
respond with those appearing in evidence, and when he does so
there is a danger that the jury may be misled. Once the formula
is before the jury, its application to the facts of the case is a
matter for argument of counsel.1 67
Our criticism of this formulation is not to be attributed to the dis-
appointment of losing counsel, for the court found the actuarial testimony
not prejudicial and affirmed the verdict. We differ with the court in its
assumption that the expert's- function is merely "to describe to the jury a
mathematical process." The process is one, as we pointed out earlier,
which the jury cannot perform by itself. If the actuary is to be of any
use, he must at least be permitted to give the present worth of payments
of $1 a month for a stated number of months. The jury, assisted by
closing argument, can safely be left to multiply that sum by the amount
of loss per month which they find. But there is no "neutral figure" the
actuary can use as to the length of the period. Some assumption must be
made. And the defendant can avoid being harmed by asking the actuary,
on cross-examination, to state the present worth of $1 a month for such
period of months as the defendant thinks the evidence might justify.
IV. APPELLATE REVIEW
The jury has determined the amount of loss and the period for which
it is recoverable, and has reduced to present worth those elements of the
damages which are subject to such a reduction. It has returned a verdict.
The trial judge has considerable control over that verdict. He may order
a new trial, 1 6 or require a remittitur, 6 9 if he believes that the jury
has determined damages improperly. This power has caused little diffi-
culty. But assume that the trial court, believing that damages have been
properly assessed, denies the motion for new trial and orders judgment
for the plaintiff. What power does the appellate court have over that
determination? We look first to the scope of review, in federal and
state courts respectively, and then consider the kinds of errors below for
which appellate courts have reversed.
167 133 N.E. 2d 288 at 294-5.
168 McCORMIcic, DAMAGES 71-4 (1935); 6 MooRE's FEDERAL PRAMCEC §59.08
[6] (2d ed. 1953).
169 Blunt v. Little, 3 Fed. Cas. No. 1578 (C.C.,D.Mass. 1822) (per Story, J.);
Comiskey v. Penna R. Co., 228 F. 2d 687 (2d Cir. 1956). 6 MooRE's FEDERAL
Pac'rCC §59.05 [3] (2d ed. 1953).
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Scope of reziew in federal courts
Little more than a decade ago, a FELA defendant challenged a
verdict on appeal to the Third Circuit on the ground that it was excessive.
judge Goodrich's answer stated wMt was then the settled federal rule
as to review for excessiveness:
The members of the Court think the verdict is too high. But
they also feel very clear there is nothing the Court can do
about it. * * * A long list of cases in the federal courts demon-
strates clearly that the federal appellate courts, including the
Supreme Court, will not review a judgment for excessiveness
of damages even in cases where the amount of damage is capa-
ble of much more precise ascertainment than it is in a personal
injury case.170
The rule has not been changed in the interim by the Supreme Court,
unless by one casual word in an opinion to be discussed later. 1 ' Yet
today 10 of the 11 circuits believe that when a verdict seems to them
excessive, there is something the court can do about it.
The precedents which supported Judge Goodrich's statement were
clear enough. In an early FELA case, the verdict was attacked on
appeal as excessive, and indeed on the stated facts, it might well have
been thought to be excessive. But Justice Holmes, for the Supreme
Court, announced that this was not ground for reversal.
It may be admitted that if it were true that the excess appeared
as matter of law,--that if, for instance, the statute fixed a
maximum and the verdict exceeded it,--a question might arise
for this court. But a case of mere excess upon the evidence is a
matter to be dealt -with by the trial court. It does not present
a question for re-examination here upon a writ of error.'7
2
Nearly twenty years later, in the Fairmount Glass Works case,17 Justice
Brandeis stated that the same rule applies to the circuit courts of appeal
when reviewing actions of the federal district courts. Our leading scholar
on damages reads that case as holding that the trial court's denial of a
new trial for excessive damages "may not be reviewed for merely
erroneous exercise of discretion,"' 1 4 and that it is not grounds for reversal
that "the jury has made an unreasonable award."' 175
Perhaps there is some law of nature that the power of appellate
courts remains contant1 70  For it was at the end of the '40s, when the
Supreme Court had taken away the power of appellate courts to substitute
170 Scott v. Baltimore & 0. R. Co., 151 F. 2d 61, 64-5 (5d Cir. 1945).
171 See Affolder v. New York, C. & St. L. R.R., 339 U.S. 96, 101 (1950),
discussed pp. 471-2 below.
172 Southern Railway-Carolina Division v. Bennett, 233 U.S. 80, 87 (1914).
173 Fairmount Glass Works v. Cub Fork Coal Co., 287 U.S. 474, 481 (1933).
174 McCoRncK, DAMAcES 67 n. 18 (1935).
175 Id. at 75.
178 For a brilliant exposition of the transfer of power from the trial court
and jury to appellate courts, see Green, Jury Trial and Mr. Justice Black, 65
YALE L. J. 482 (1956).
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their judgment for that of the jury on liability issues," 7 that federal ap-
pellate judges first began to claim the power to control the amount of dam-
ages. The first break came in 1948, in Virginian Railway Co. v. d4rmen-
trout."' A backing locomotive had cut off the hands and portions of the
arms of a 13 months old infant. On an earlier appeal, a verdict of
$100,000 had been set aside, and a new trial ordered, for errors of sub-
stantive law in the charge. 7 ' At the subsequent trial, the jury awarded
$160,000, and the trial court denied a motion to set the verdict aside
as excessive. The Fourth Circuit stated that there could be no question
but that this verdict was greatly in excess of any proper award. And
after citing the Fairmount Glass Works case for the proposition that
normally there can be no reversal for excessive damages, the court said:
We do not understand the rule to have application, however,
in those exceptional circumstances where the verdict is so mani-
festly without support in the evidence that failure to set it aside
amounts to an abuse of discretion. In a situation of that sort,
reversal is no more based on "error in fact" than reversal for
refusal to direct a verdict for insufficiency of evidence.
Whether there has been an abuse of discretion is a question of
law in the one case, just as is the legal sufficiency of the evidence
in the other. An appellate court is not required to place the seal
of its approval upon a judgment vitiated by an abuse or discre-
tion. 18 0
Holding that the trial court had abused its discretion in denying the
motion for a new trial on the ground of excessive damages, the Fourth
Circuit reversed for a new trial.
The irmentrout decision might well have been a sport, soon to be
forgotten, had it not been for one word which crept into a Supreme
Court decision the following year. In dffolder v. New York, C. &
St. L. R. R.,' the Court closed an opinion devoted entirely to sub-
stantive issues with the following sentence:
We agree with the Court of Appeals that the amount of
damages awarded by the District Court's judgment is not mon-
strous in the circumstances of this case. 1 82
The floodgates were opened. Impatient appellate judges. 3 found in
this offhand sentence an implication that there can be reversals for
excessive damages if the verdict is "monstrous" and proceeded to write
off the books the old law of nonreviewability.
In 1949, before Affolder, the Ninth Circuit unanimously agreed
'77 Id. at 488.
178 166 F. 2d 400 (4th Cir. 1948).
179 158 F. 2d 358 (4th Cir. 1946).
180 166 F. 2d 400 at 408.
181339 U.S. 96 (1950).
'
2
"Id, at 101.
183And some commentators. See 6 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE §59.08 [6]
(2d ed. 1953).
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that $100,000 was too much for the loss of a leg, but a majority of
the court held that they lacked power to do anything about it.184 In
1951, on rehearing en banc, that court announced that Affolder had
confirmed the power of appellate courts to set aside grossly excessive
verdicts, but decided that the verdict before it, while excessive, was not
grossly excessive."8 5 A dissenting judge, with more candor than most,
would have swept aside nice distinctions about excessive and grossly ex-
cessive, and claimed the appellate court should reverse whenever it thinks
the verdict is too high.' That same year the Third Circuit, whose 1945
announcement that there is nothing an appellate court can do if a verdict
is excessive has been quoted above,1 87 said, by way of dicta, that it can
reverse if the verdict is grossly excessive.188 This court also announced
that its new rule was in accord with the implications of the Affolder case.
And in 1951 the Sixth Circuit claimed, but did not exercise, a power to
reverse if the verdict is so excessive that the trial court abused his discre-
tion in den3ing a new trial."8 9
Every other circuit except the Eighth has followed suit, though not
without confusion and difficulty. In 1951 the Seventh Circuit considered
the whole matter carefully, said that even despite Affolder it could not
reverse because a verdict is excessive, but announced that where it be-
lieved the verdict to be too high, it would scrutinize the record with care
to hunt for other error. To no one's surprise, it found some.190 Twice
in 1952 the court stuck by the proposition that it would not review a
judgment for excessiveness of damages.1' 1 But later that year, the
Seventh Circuit also succumbed.' 9' The Supreme Court cases holding
there is to be no review on this ground were blithely cast aside as "an
old procedural impediment" which "no longer bars review." 193 Nor did
the court linger over the "grossly excessive" and "monstrous" tests which
had attracted other courts. These were dismissed as "little more than
comparatives dependent for their meaning upon the facts of each case,
the nature of the damages, the wrong to be remedied."' 94 Mere excess
184 Southern Pac. Co. v. Guthrie, 180 F. 2d 295 (9th Cir. 1949).
185 Southern Pac. Co. v. Guthrie, 186 F. 2d 926 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied
341 U.s. 904 (1951).
18O 186 F. 2d 926 at 934.
187 p. 467 above.
1S See Trowbridge v. Abrasive Co. of Philadelphia, 190 F. 2d 825, 830
(3d Cir. 1951). And see Brest v. Philadelphia Transportation Co., 216 F. 2d 331
(3d Cir. 1954).
18 0 See Sebring Trucking Co. v. White, 187 F. 2d 486 (6th Cir. 1954).
190 Wetherbee v. Elgin, J. & E. Ry. Co., 191 F. 2d 302 (7th Cir. 1951), cert.
denied 946 U.S. 867 (1953).
191 Flener v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 198 F. 2d 77, 80 (7th Cir. 1952); Kamin-
ski v. Chicago R. & I. R. Co., 200 F. 2d 1 (7th Cir. 1952).
19 2 See Bucher v. Krause, 200 F. 2d 576, 586-8 (7th Cir. 1952), cert. denied
345 U.S. 997 (1953).
103 200 F. 2d 576 at 586.
194 200 F. 2d 576 at 587.
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is enough for reversal in the Seventh Circuit. As was true of so many
of the other circuits, this new law was announced as dicta in a case
where the court found the verdict not excessive.
The Tenth Circuit has found a power to reverse for excessive dam-
ages, but announced a rule of self-restraint that the trial court will not
ordinarily be held to have abused its discretion unless it affirmatively
appears that the verdict resulted from bias, prejudice, or passion.19 5 And
the District of Columbia Circuit, in a more thoughtful opinion than
most, has adopted the "grossly excessive or monstrous" test. 9 '
The First and Second Circuits stood by the old law for a time. In
1952 the First Circuit said unequivocally that "the defendant cannot
relitigate the issue of damages on this appeal, as it seeks to do."' 0 7 And
in 1954 then-Judge Harlan, for the Second Circuit, examined the old
precedents with care, declared them to be still the law, and said that
an appellate court will not even consider whether the trial judge should
have so appraised the facts evidenced in the record as requiring an exer-
cise of his discretionary power. 9 ' These were dying gasps. Both circuits
have since enlisted under the banner of more power for appellate
judges.199 One surmises that the Fifth Circuit has also adopted that
view, though its decisions seem to us somechat inconsistent."' 0
195 See Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Kifer, 216 F. 2d 753, 757 (10th Cir.
1954), cert. denied 348 U. S. 917 (1955).
196See Hulett v. Brinson, 229 F. 2d 22, 23-5 (D.C. Cir. 1955), cert. denied
350 U.S. 1014 (1956).
197 New York, N.H. & H. R. Co. v. Zermani, 200 F. 2d 240, 245-6 (1st Cir.
1952), cert. denied 345 U.S. 917 (1953).
198 Stevenson v. Hearst Consol. Publications, Inc., 214 F. 2d 902, 911-2 (2d
Cir. 1954), cert. denied 348 U.S. 874 (1954). Accord: Kennair v. Mississippi
Shipping Co., 197 F. 2d 605, 607 (2d Cir. 1952): "While it may be that the amount
of the award is somewhat large in view of the injuries sustained, we have held
on more than one occasion that we will not interfere in such a situation and that
the reduction of the jury's verdict is a matter wholly within the discretion of the
trial judge."
'
9 9 See Ballard v. Forbes, 208 F. 2d 883, 888 (1st Cir. 1954); Comiskey v.
Penna. R. Co., 228 F. 2d 687, 688 (2d Cir. 1956). But ef. Renaldi v. New York,
N.H. & H. R. Co., 230 F. 2d 841 (2d Cir. 1956).
200 The most recent pronouncement, Fort Worth & D. IL Co. v. Harris, 230
F. 2d 680, 682 (5th Cir. 1956), is that excessiveness of the verdict is exclusively
for the trial court to determine. This reflects a whole line of post-A ffolder deci-
sions to that effect: Texas P-M Pac. Term. R. v. Welsh, 179 F. 2d 880, 882 (5th
Cir. 1950) ; Sunray Oil Corp. v. Allbritton, 187 F. 2d 475 (5th Cir. 1951), cert.
denied 342 U.S. 828 (1951) ; Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Burkett, 192 F. 2d 941,
945 (5th Cir. 1951) ; Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Dixon, 207 F. 2d 899 (5th Cir.
1953). But seeing is believing. Though it is not even cited in the latest Fifth
Circuit opinion in point, in Whitman v. Pitrie, 200 F. 2d 914 (5th Cir. 1955), that
court actually ordered a new trial as to damages because of abuse of discretion by
the trial judge in denying a new trial for an excessive verdict. It should in-
cidentally be noted that the most exhaustive and scholarly discussion anywhere in
the literature supporting appellate review of the size of verdicts is the dissent of
Judge Holmes in Sunray Oil Corp. v. Allbritton, supra, at 477.
DAMAGES UNDER FELA
Only the Eighth Circuit has stood firm. It was the Eighth Circuit
which was reversed, though not on any damages issue, in the Affolder
case. And therein lies a story. Does the one word "monstrous", in the
final sentence of the Affolder opinion, mean that the Supreme Court
was giving appellate courts a power which had always theretofore been
denied by Supreme Court decisions? Close examination of Atffolder is
justified.
The A/folder case was a suit under the Safety Appliance Act for
injuries sustained when two cars failed to couple automatically upon
impact. The verdict was $95,000, and a remittitur of $15,000 was
ordered by the trial court. The opinion of the Eighth Circuit was de-
voted to claims of error in the instructions to the jury as to proximate
cause. That court, believing it found error, reversed.2"1 But it went
on to say that the assignment of error that the verdict was excessive was
not properly addressed to the appellate court, citing cases which had laid
down the rule of nonreviewability. °2 Affolder's petition for certiorari
was granted. Neither his petition nor his brief said a word about damages.
At the very end of respondent's brief, there was a two page discussion
of damages.20 ' It was not directed to whether the damages were "mon-
strous" or otherwise excessive. It claimed only that the Eighth Circuit's
decision that it could not review the amount of damages was in conflict
with the decision of the Fourth Circuit in Armentroutj that the Armen-
trout rule should prevail, and that if the Court should decide for Affolder
on the causation issue, it should remand to the Court of Appeals to de-
termine whether the damages were, in fact, excessive. There was no
discussion of the history of nonreviewability, nor of any cases prior to
the 4rmentrout decision one year before. Petitioner's reply brief devoted
three pages to this issue.204 It cited the Supreme Court decisions which
had denied a power to review the amount of damages, and discussed the
facts briefly to show that in any event the award was quite reasonable.
Thus the statement by the Supreme Court that "we agree with the
Court of Appeals that the amount of damages * * * is not monstrous" 5
is incorrect. The Court of Appeals had formed no opinion one way or
the other as to the reasonableness of the judgment, as that court itself
quickly pointed out.2"' Second, the railroad had not claimed in the Su-
preme Court that the damages were "monstrous?- or otherwise excessive;
it had claimed only that the Court of Appeals should pass on the question.
201 New York, C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Affolder, 174 F. 2d 486 (8th Cir. 1949).
2 0 2 1d. at 493.
203 Brief for Respondent, pp. 34-5, Affolder v. New York, C. & St. L. R. Co.,
339 U.S. 96 (1950).
204 Reply Brief for Petitioner, pp. 16-8, Affolder v. New York, C. & St. L. R.
Co., 339 U.S. 96 (1950).
205 339 U.S. 96 at 101.
2 0 See St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. v. Ferguson, 182 F. 2d 949, 955
(8th Cir. 1950).
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Third, if Affolder really meant to make new law as to reviewability, as
so many of the circuits have thought, 20 7 it is remarkable that the Supreme
Court should have announced this new law: (a) by a casual phrase in an
opinion otherwise entirely devoted to other issues; (b) without paying
the old precedents at least the respect of pointing out why they are no
longer the law; and (c) in a case where the briefs made not the slightest
attempt to explain why the law had, or should be, changed. It may be
that this is the way the Supreme Court makes new law. But it may also
be that impatient Court of Appeals judges have succumbed to the tempta-
tion "to embrace the exhilarating opportunity of anticipating a doctrine
which may be in the womb of time, but whose birth is distant * *.,205
The Eighth Circuit has stuck to its guns. There alone is the decision
of the trial judge and the jury final on the amount of damages.2 0 9 But
lately there have been tantalizing hints that that great court may soon
have impressive support. Twice recently the Supreme Court has granted
certiorari to review decisions in which appellate courts have ordered new
trials because of excessive damages. In each case the petition for certiorari
asked the Court to decide whether the Courts of Appeals have such a
power. But the Court has never reached the question of power, for in
both cases the Court found that there was evidence to support the verdict,
and thus that the Court of Appeals, whether or not it had the power,
should not have intervened. 1 ° One of these cases, Neese v. Southern
Railway Co., has been set out in detail earlier.2 1 1 The judgment there
was generous by any test. The Fourth Circuit treated it as if it were
an extreme example of an excessive verdict.212  The decision by the
Supreme Court that the judgment should have been affirmed shows, at the
207But see Stevenson v. Hearst Consol. Publications, Inc., 214 F. 2d 902,
911-2 (2d Cir. 1954) (per Harlan, J.), cert. denied 348 U.S. 874 (1954).20 8 L. Hand, J., in Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. Walsh, 139 F. 2d 809, 823
(2d Cir. 1943).
209 National Alfalfa Dehydrating & Milling Co. v. Sorenson, 220 F. 2d 858,
861 (8th Cir. 1955): "Defendant's first contention is that the verdict is excessive.
The short answer to this contention is that in Federal courts in tort cases the
question of the alleged excessiveness of the verdict is not reviewable on appeal."
But there is very recent dicta that makes us fearful even the Eighth Circuit may
be weakening. Chicago G. V. Ry. Co. v. Casena, 234 F. 2d 44-1, 448-9 (8th Cir.
1956).
210 Neese v. Southern Ry. Co., 350 U.S. 77 (1955); Snyder v. United
States, 350 U.S. 906 (1955).
211 Pp. 449-50 above.
212 It called the verdict "far beyond the pale of any reasonable probability
and entirely without support in the record." Southern Ry. Co. v. Neese, 216 F. 2d
772, 776 (4th Cir. 1954), rev'd 350 U.S. 77 (1955). In the other case, United States
v. Guyer, 218 F. 2d 266 (4th Cir. 1954), rev'd sub nom. Snyder v. United States,
350 U.S. 906 (1955), the trial court, sitting without a jury, had awarded $8000
each in a suit for wrongful death of two girls, 6 years old and 8 weeks old, under
the Federal Tort Claims Act. The Fourth Circuit, saying that it is practically
impossible to determine the value of the life of a little child, almost casually cut
the awards to $5000 each.
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very least, that the Courts of Appeal should be cautious indeed in revers-
ing verdicts because of the size of the damages. If the decision of the trialjudge and jury in Neese was proper, as the Supreme Court held, there
will be very few cases where appellate intervention will be proper.
Perhaps by reversing in Neese without reaching the question of
power, the Supreme Court hoped to cut down on appellate interference
with damage awards,2 13 without however absolutely barring the door
against such interference should a really extreme case come along. With
deference to a Court that has done great things for the railroad workman
in breathing life into FELA, we suggest that such a course is unwise.
There are some Courts of Appeal which will imagine they see such an
extreme case in every moderately adequate award. The Supreme Court
will not, and should not, grant certiorari every time an appellate court
disagrees with the trial court on the reasonableness of the damages. 214
The extreme verdict, against which a residual appellate power may be
thought desirable, strikes us as an imaginary horror. We have partic-
ipated in and read thousands of FELA cases, and have yet to see a
verdict, approved by the trial court, which was so high that reasonable
men would necessarily agree it was out of line. We have seen generous
verdicts-though all too few. We have seen a few verdicts which were
more than we would have awarded, had we been on the jury. But we
have never found one that was plainly "monstrous."
The best safeguard against an extreme verdict is the common sense
of the jury. On all other issues we trust the constitutional tribunal-why
not on damages? And should the jury err, the trial judge has ample
power to set the verdict aside.21 5 If he concurs in the judgment of thejury, we believe there is no need for further review of the damages.
Those appellate courts which have held otherwise have brought upon
themselves an unnecessary burden, by inviting every losing railroad to
relitigate damages on appeal, an endeavor which, in the light of the
Neese case, should surely be futile.
Scope of rev;ew in state courts
It would seem that one uniform rule should govern the scope
213 The Neese decision seems to be having this effect. See Renaldi v. New
York, N.H. & H. R. Co., 230 F. 2d 841, 845 (2d Cir. 1956); Hulett v. Brinson, 229
F. 2d 22, 26 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
214 Thus in Snyder v. United States, 350 U.S. 906 (1955), four of the justices
would have dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted. See Note,
Supreme Court Certiorari Policy in Cases Arising Under the FELA, 69 HARv. L.
REV. 1441 (1956).
215 "The trial judges have a heavy responsibility in these Federal Employer
Liability Act cases to see the damages are kept within reasonable bounds. They
apparently have considerable discretion in passing on motions for a new trial
based on claimed excessive verdicts. They sense the atmosphere of the trial, have
the feel of the case and have opportunity to observe whether bias, passion or
prejudice are present." Padilla v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co., 295 P. 2d 1023,
1028 (N.M. 1956). See also notes 168-9 above, and authorities there cited.
1956]
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of review of damage awards in FELA actions. We know that the
measure of damages itself is determined by a uniform federal rule, to
which state conceptions must yield. 16 And the Supreme Court has held
that no matter what a state appellate court can do in ordinary cases, it
cannot order a remittitur in a FELA action but must grant a new trial,
where the verdict was produced by passion and prejudice. 217 Finally on
such issues as negligence and causation, state appellate courts have been
confined within the same narrow limits which apply to review in the
federal appellate courts. 218 Nevertheless, on damages the state courts
have successfully exercised much broader powers of review than any
federal court has claimed.219 Those state courts which have discussed
the question have said that their power of review of the amount of the
verdict is a mere detail of practice and procedure, as to which the ordinary
rules of the forum apply. 220 Analytically this cannot be justified. Under
the cover of a local rule of practice, some states-most notoriously
Missouri and Minnesota-have effectively transferred the power to
determine damages from the jury to the appellate court, and have in
fact substituted new and bizarre criteria of their own invention as to
damages. If, as we are frequently told, the right to trial by jury is
part and parcel of the worker's remedy under FELA,221 those states
which have stripped the jury of ultimate power over damages have
taken away a vital part of the employee's remedy.222 Perhaps the states
have gotten away with this because of the difficulty of securing Supreme
Court review of a state supreme court decision ordering a new trial
216 Chesapeake & 0. Ry. Co. v. Kelly, 241 U.S. 485, 491 (1916): "But the
question of the proper measure of damages is inseparably connected with the
right of action, and in cases arising under the Federal employers' liability act it
must be settled according to general principles of law as administered in the
Federal courts."
217 Minneapolis, St. P. & S.S.M. Ry. Co. v. Moquin, 283 U.S. 520 (1931),
approved 10 TEx. L. REV. 240 (1932).
218 Tennant v. Peoria and P. U. R. Co., 321 U.S. 29, 35 (1944); Lavender
v. Kurn, 327 U.S. 645, 653 (1946); Harsh v. Illinois Term. R. Co., 348 U.S. 940
(1955), reversing 351 I1. App. 272, 114 N.E. 2d 901 (1953); Note, 37 CORNEL.
L. Q. 799, 800-1 (1952).
2 19 The decision in Union Pac. R. Co. v. Hadley, 246 U.S. 330 (1918),
holding that a state appellate court can order a remittitur if it thinks the verdict
too high, came at a time when appellate courts were allowed much more leeway on
all FELA questions than they are today.
220 See, e.g., Counts v. Thompson, 359 Mo. 485, 502-3, 222 S.W. 2d 487, 495
(1949) ; Avance v. Thompson, 320 Ill. App. 406, 418-9, 51 N.E. 2d 334, 340 (1943),
ree.'d on other grounds 387 I1. 77, 55 N.E. 2d 57 (1944), cert. denied 323 U.S. 753
(1944). In Padilla v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 295 P. 2d 1023, 1026 (N. M.
1956), the court said that it was bound by the federal standard of limited review
of damages in FELA actions, but it overruled itself on this point, and determined
that the scope of review is a mere detail of practice regulated by the law of the
forum, in Rivera v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 299 P. 2d 1090 (N.M. 1956).
221 See Bailey v. Cent. Vt. Ry., Inc., 319 U.S. 350, 354 (1943).
222 Cf. Brown v. Western Ry. of Alabama, 338 U.S. 294 (1949).
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because of excessive damages, or calling for a remittitur. Such a decision
is not a final judgment of the state court, and cannot be reviewed by
the Supreme Court,22 3 though a similar order by a federal Court of
Appeals would be reviewable. 224.
Some state courts have held consistently to a narrow and proper
review of the amount of verdicts. These states adhere to the old rule
of Chancellor Kent, that an appellate court will intervene because of
the size of the verdict only where the verdict is so excessive, or so
"flagrantly outrageous" as some courts put it,221 as to show clearly that
it was the result of passion, prejudice, or corruption.2 26
Other state courts do not consider themselves so confined. Thus
even where the court admits that the verdict is not tainted by passion,
prejudice, or corruption, it may unabashedly claim a right to weigh the
evidence and determine the amount of permissible damages for itself.22
t
The Minnesota Supreme Court, a new recruit to this camp, announces
its "recourse to common sense and social practicality in given cases." 228
But even the broadest power of review claimed elsewhere palls in com-
parison with the audacity with which the Missouri Supreme Court butchers
verdicts. In Missouri there is no nonsense of looking to the evidence
below on damages. Instead huge remittiturs are ordered to reduce the
award to an amount which the appellate court thinks comparable with
awards it has approved ;n other cases. 22 1 Present Missouri practice has
been summarized by a discerning commentator:
223E.g., Mississippi Cent. R. Co. v. Smith, 295 U.S. 718 (1935). If the
plaintiff consents to the remittitur, then the action of the state appellate court is
technically an affirmance of a final judgment, and can be reviewed by the Supreme
Court. E.g., Union Pac. R. Co. v. Hadley, 246 U.S. 330 (1918).
224E.g., Neese v. Southern Ry. Co., 350 U.S. 77 (1955);'STEARN & GRESSMAN
SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 12-3, 130-1 (2d ed. 1954).
225See Bartlebaugh v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 78 N.E. 2d 410, 414 (Ohio
App. 1948), modified 150 Ohio St. 387, 82 N.E. 2d 853 (1948); Allied Van Lines,
Inc. v. Parsons, 80 Ariz. 88, 293 P. 2d 420, 436 (1956) (non-FELA case).
220 See Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Taylor, 260 Ala. 401, 408, 71 So. 2d 27,
33 (1954) ; Ericksen v. Southern Pac. Co., 39 Cal. 2d 374, 382, 246 P. 2d 642, 647
(1952), cert. denied 344 U.S. 897 (1952); Western & A. R. R. v. Burnett, 79 Ga.
App. 530, 541-3, 54 S.E. 2d 357, 366-7 (1949) ; Hahn v. Moore, 133 N.E. 2d 900,
909 (Ind. App. 1956) (non-FELA case); Padilla v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co.,
295 P. 2d 1023, 1026 (N.M. 1956); Ward v. Denver & R.G.W. R. Co., 96 Utah
364, 5934, 85 P. 2d 837, 850 (1939). Chancellor Kent first stated this much quoted
formula in Coleman v. Southwick, 9 Johns. (N.Y.) 45, 6 Am. Dec. 253 (1812).
227 E.g., St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co. v. King, 278 P. 2d 845, 848 (Okla.
1954); Rudolph v. City of New York, 150 N.Y.S. 2d 40 (App. Div. 1956); Jaffe,
Damages for Personal Injury: The Impact of Insurance, 18 L. & CONTEMP. PRoa.
219, 232-4 (1953).
22 8 See Ahlstrom v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S.S.M. R. Co., 244 Minn. 1, 27,
68 NAV. 2d 873, 889 (1955). Accord: Hallada v. Great Northern Ry., 244 Minn.
81, 69 N.V. 2d 673 (1955), cert. denied 350 U.S. 874 (1955).
229 E.g., Cassano v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 362 Mo. 1207, 247 S.W. 2d
786 (1952) ($60,000 verdict, reduced to $45,000 by trial court, and to $35,000 by
19561
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As a practical matter, the appellate courts today act as a review-
ing jury when a personal injury case comes before them on
appeal. They now hold that they can review the weight of the
evidence, and that they can review facts as a result thereof.
They state that the parties should be afforded the experience
of the court in determining the award for injuries. They state
it is their duty to keep the damages uniform by the use of
remittitur. * * *
In view of the questionable growth of remittitur, and the
still existing doubts as to its validity in unliquidated actions,
it would seem that the court would be rather hesitant in using
the doctrine. However, as the figures above indicate, the su-
preme court uses remittitur with ever increasing frequency, and
for huge reductions of the jury verdicts. One wonders how so
many juries could be so badly mistaken in awarding damages. 23 0
Passion and prejudice
Of course it is proper for either the trial or the appellate court to
set aside the verdict if there has been misconduct in the trial of a sort
to invite passion and prejudice among the jury.231 This subject is hardly
unique to damage issues. But we here take brief note of certain kinds
of claimed misconduct which have special implications as to damages.
A court may intervene if counsel in his argument suggests to the
jury extraneous factors as to damages which are not properly before
the jury. Thus it would certainly be error for plaintiff's lawyer to tell
the jury that one-third of the judgment will go to the attorney as his
fee. By the same token defendant's lawyer may not tell the jury that
the judgment is not subject to income tax. Although an early case
held that an instruction to this effect by the court would be proper,
232
later cases have held that the taxability of the verdict, like the attorney's
fee, is a matter between the plaintiff and a third party, in which the
defendant has no interest, and which the jury should not be invited to
consider. 23 3 So too in a recent case the defense managed to bring in
appellate court); Counts v. Thompson, 359 Mo. 485, 222 S.W. 2d 4S7 (1949)
(verdict of $165,000, reduced to $140,000 by trial court, and to $80,000 by appellate
court).
230 Comment, Power of the Appellate Courts of Missouri to Order Remittitur
in Unliquidated Damage Cases, 17 Mo. L. REv. 340, 345-6, 348 (1952).
231 See Minneapolis, St. P. & S.S.M. Ry. Co. v. Moquin, 283 U.S. 520, 521
(1931).
232 Dempsey v. Thompson, 363 Mo. 339, 251 S.W. 2d 42 (1952).
233 In Hall v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 5 Ill. 2d 135, 125 N.E. 2d 77 (1955),
noted 43 ILL.B.J. 810, defendant's jury argument that any award would be non-
taxable was held prejudicial error, necessitating a new trial. It has also been held
that the jury is not to be instructed to this effect. Combs v. Chicago, St. P., M. &
0. Ry. Co., 135 F.Supp. 750 (S.D.Iowa 1955) ; Highshew v. Kushto, 134 N.E. 2d
555 (Ind. 1956); Maus v. New York, C. & St. L. R. Co., 135 N.E. 2d 253 (Ohio
Sup. Ct. 1956). And see cases cited note 25 supra. In the Maus case, supra, the
court expressly left open the question of what the judge should do if the jury, on
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the fact that plaintiff was receiving a pension under the Railroad Re-
tirement Act, though the trial court had earlier held that this was im-
proper and not to be considered by the jury. The Third Circuit, holding
that "the last moment reiteration by the defense of the -barred evidence
gravely and unwarrantably impaired the worth of plaintiff's claim to
the jury," ordered a new trial.23 4
Defendants' lawyers would prefer not to have the jury consider
that the injured or killed workman was a family man, apparently be-
lieving that the thought of the bereft family may tug at the jurors'
heartstrings. Of course in a death action the facts as to the age of the
wife and children must be admitted in evidence, since the damages to
be awarded are directly related to these facts. And in a death case, it
would be error to exclude the children from the courtroom, at least
so long as they are well behaved, since they are parties in interest in the
suit.2"5 But if the suit is one for injuries, the existence of a family is
irrelevant, and the senior author, when he was young, once.jeopardized
a verdict by asking the plaintiff if he had a family.23 6 It is not miscon-
duct, however, for the wife and children to be in the courtroom, and
for the plaintiff to rejoin them when he leaves the stand,, although
if the children are small they possibly can be excluded from the court-
room in an injuries case.
We do not countenance appeals to passion by counsel. At the same
time we recognize that the maimed workman or the grief-stricken widow
are inevitably pathetic sights, and that there is no way to exclude human
sympathies from the courtroom. Some years ago, in a case tried by
the senior author, a jury in federal court in New York awarded $130,000
to a 43 year old plaintiff who had been earning $2805.44 per year prior
to the loss of both his feet. The plaintiff was a very small man, who
wore leather protectors or pads which enabled him to walk on his knees
with two little short canes. When he was called as a witness he neces-
sarily walked from his wheel chair to the stand in this manner. The
trial judge, in ordering a remittitur of $30,000, said:
I think that the members of the jury were unduly affected by
its own initiative, asked about income tax. We believe the judge should say: "The
matter of income tax has nothing to do with this case and will not be discussed
or considered by you in any way."
234 Sinovich v. Erie R. Co., 230 F. 2d 658 (3d Cir. 1956). Consider also
Coleman v. Southern Pac. Co., 296 P. 2d 386 (Cal. App. 1956), where it was held
prejudicial error to allow argument, evidence and instructions that a railroad
employee suing for permanent disability resulting from a back injury had earlier
received a $40,000 settlement from the railroad for a prior injury to his back, as
to which he had then claimed possible permanent disability.
235 Starck v. Chicago & N.V. Ry. Co., 4 Il1. 2d 611, 123 N.E. 2d 826 (1954);
cf. Chicago G.W. Ry. Co. v. Beecher, 150 F. 2d 394 (8th Cir. 1945).
230 Thompson v. Boles, 123 F. 2d 487, 494-5 (8th Cir. 1941) ; cf. Texas & P.
Ry. Co. v. Buckles, 232 F. 2d 257 (5th Cir. 1956), cert. denied 351 U. S. 984 (1956).
2 3 7 See Delaney v. New York Cent. R. Co., 68 F. Supp. 70, 72 (S.D.N.Y. 1946).
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sympathy. McKinney had a particularly winning and attractive
personality and as he crept on his knees past the jury box to the
witnessstand and climbed upon the witness stand, he was quite
an appealing sight.23
Other judges have credited the jury with stronger resistance to the
inevitable appeal to their sympathy. In one case a motion was made to
set aside a verdict of $165,000 for a man who had lost both legs, where
the present value of his future earnings was $113,000. The defendant
claimed the jury was unduly influenced by the sight of plaintiff sitting
in a wheel chair, by the fact that he broke down and cried on the wit-
ness stand, and by the fact that his wife, who was crippled herself, testified
that she could not properly attend plaintiff and care for his wants. But
the court refused to interfere with the verdict.23 9
Misconduct is frequently claimed in the remarks hurled by counsel
for one side at the other side. If these outbursts were onesided, of course
they would require remedial action by the court. But they never are.
When good lawyers are trying a case, there is no difficulty with claims
of misconduct. But when one or both lawyers are less able, bickering
between counsel is likely to arise. And when one lawyer starts calling
names, his opponent would be less than human-and probably unfair to
his client's interests-if be failed to retaliate. There can be no rule as
to how much in such an exchange is to be chalked up to "the heat of
oratory", and how much is to be regarded as an appeal to passion and
prejudice.2 42 On this issue particularly, much must be left to the trial
judge, for he was in the courtroom, and has a better understanding of
what really happened than can be obtained from the cold words in the
printed record.
Excuses for finding verdicts excessive
As we showed earlier, many courts no longer require passion,
prejudice, or corruption as a condition to setting a verdict asid&. Here
we examine some of the other standards appellate courts use to tamper
with verdicts.
One popular recent claim is that the jury failed to make a deduction
for plaintiff's own negligence. As is well known, FELA abolishes con-
tributory negligence as a defense, and provides that if the plaintiff's
negligence contributed to the injury, the damages awarded should be pro-
portionately decreased.241 Thus in the infamous Wetherbee case,24 2 the
Seventh Circuit-which at that time was still denying that it could do
anything about an excessive verdict--said that the jury had given the
maximum possible damages, that the workman had been negligent as a
2 38 McKinney v. Pittsburgh & L.E. R. Co., 57 F. Supp. 813 (S.D.N.Y. 1944).
239 Delaney v. New York Cent. R. Co., 68 F. Supp. 70 (S.D.N.Y. 1946).
240 The following cases are suggestive: Lanni v. Wyer, 219 F. 2d 701 (2d
Cir. 1955); Missouri-K-T R. Co. v. Ridgway, 191 F. 2d 363 (8th Cir. 1951);
James v. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry. Co., 218 Minn. 333, 16 N.V. 2d 1S (1944);
Devine v. Southern Pac. Co., 295 P. 2d 201 (Ore. 1956).
24145 U.S.C. §53; Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Earnest, 229 U.S. 114 (1913).
2 4 2 Wetherbee v. Elgin, J. & E. Ry. Co., 191 F. 2d 302 (7th Cir. 1951), cert.
denied 346 U.S. 867 (1953).
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matter of law, and thus that the judgment could be reversed because
of the error of the jury in failing to deduct for the workman's negli-
gence.2
43
There are certain circumstances in which failure to deduct for
contributory negligence would appear as a matter of law and would
justify reversal. But these are quite limited circumstances indeed. First,
plaintiff's negligence would have to appear as a matter of law. 244 Absent
an admission of negligence or a special interrogatory finding plaintiff
to have been negligent, an appellate court will rarely be able to say that
plaintiff was negligent as a matter of law, in view of Supreme Court
decisions which leave such questions to the jury as long as there is any
evidence from which the jury could have concluded as it did.245 Second,
it would have to be a case in which the jury could not have found a
violation of the Safety Appliance Act,2 46 since there is no deduction for
plaintiff's negligence if a violation of that act contributed in whole or
part to the injury2 4 7 Finally, the appellate court would have to be able
to say that the amount awarded was the maximum which the jury could
have given had there been no issue of plaintiff's own negligence. Normally
this will be true only where the jury has given the full amount sued for,
or where it has answered a special interrogatory as to the total amount
of plaintiff's damage. In the absence of such a showing, the appellate
court will not be able to say that the jury failed to deduct for plaintiff's
negligence, and will have to assume that the jury made such a deduc-
243 Remittiturs were ordered because of the failure of the jury to deduct for
contributory negligence in Scneder v. Wabash R. Co., 272 S.W. 2d 198 (Mo. 1954),
and Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Grizzard, 238 Ala. 49, 189 So. 303 (1939) cert.
denied 308 U.S. 603 (1939).
244 In the following cases it was held that there could be no reversal for
failure to deduct for contributory negligence since it did not appear as a matter
of law that plaintiff had been contributorily negligent. Missouri Pac. L Co. v.
Zolliecoffer, 209 Ark. 559, 191 S.W. 2d 587 (1946) ; Erickson v. Southern Pac. Co.,
39 Cal. 2d 374, 246 P. 2d 642 (1952), cert. denied 344 U.S. 897 (1952); Jackson
v. Rutledge, 188 Ind. 415, 122 N.E. 579 (1919) ; Padilla v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry.
Co., 295 P. 2d 1023, 1027 (N.M. 1956); Schlatter v. McCarthy, 113 Utah 543, 196
P. 2d 968 (1948). The case of Atlantic C.L. R. Co. v. Taylor, 260 Ala. 401, 71
So. 2d 27 (1954), is especially interesting, for there the court refused to reverse
though the verdict was for the full present worth of the proven contributions, and
there was undisputed evidence the deceased had violated a company rule.
245 E.g., Union Pac. R. Co. v. Hadley, 246 U.S. 330, 334 (1918); Moore,
Recent Trends in Judicial Interpretation in Railroad Cases under the Federal
Employers' Liability Act, 29 MARa. L. REv. 73 (1946); Alderman, What the New
Supreme Court Has Done to the Old Law of Negligence, 18 L. & CONTMP. PROB.
110 (1953); DeParcq, A Decade of Progress under the Federal Employers' Lia-
bility Act, id. at 259.
24645 U.S.C. §§1 et seq. Thus in Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Chapman,
S+ Ga. App. 94, 65 S.E. 2d 629 (1951), the court rejected a contention that the
evidence required a finding that plaintiff had been contributorily negligent, and
that a verdict for the full amount demanded was therefore excessive, saying that
the evidence would have permitted a finding that the injuries were due in part
to a violation of the Safety Appliance Act.
24745 U.S.C. §53; Coray v. Southern Pac. Co., 335 U.S. 520 (1949).
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tion as required by its instruction.248 So too, where it appears that the
jury did make a deduction, an appellate court cannot reverse because
the deduction was not large enough; it is for the jury to determine the
percentage by which recovery is to be reduced. 49
Failure of the jury to deduct for contributory negligence has some
claim to validity as a reason for reversal, though as we have shown, it
will be a highly unusual case in which all the necessary conditions for
such a reversal will be present. Some of the other reasons on which
appellate courts rely lack even this faint claim to being proper.
We have already alluded to the Missouri standard of comparison
with past verdicts. In a typical case a 36 year old brakeman had had both
legs amputated above the knees and suffered other injuries, and could
only get around in a wheelchair. The trial court ordered a remittitur
of $25,000 of the $165,000 verdict. But this was not enough for the
Missouri Supreme Court, Which cut an additional $60,000.2"' Thus the
injured man was left with less than one-half the amount which the
jury had awarded him. The court made no pretense of examining the
evidence to see what the jury might justifiably have awarded for each
of the elements of damage. Instead it found one of its own decisions
11 years before with, as it said, comparable injuries. In the older case
the court had reduced an $85,000 verdict to $40,000.51 The court
agreed that some increase in the size of verdicts was justified, but decided
that $80,000 was the maximum permissible for injuries of this sort.
The court never mentions, and may not even have thought relevant, the
fact that the plaintiff in the earlier case was 6 years older than the plain-
tiff in the later case, and that the jury could have found the latter had a
gross earning capacity of $450 a month, as against $214 a month
for the former.
The deficiencies of the "comparable verdicts" test are obvious.
It completely abandons any attempt to compute damages scientifically, on
the basis of the evidence. It deprives the jury of any real function in the
award of damages. 52 And it is a purely one-sided rule, since verdicts
are reduced to make them comparable with what has been allowed in the
248 See Hall v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 5 11. 2d 135, 150, 125 N.E. 2d 77,
85 (1955): "However, by the very nature of the jury system, this court cannot
indulge the presumption that juries do not follow the instructions of the courts."
249 E.g., Starck v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 4 Ill. 2d 611, 625, 123 N.E 2d
826, 834 (1954).
250 Counts v. Thompson, 359 Mo. 485, 222 S.W. 2d 487 (1949).
251Aly v. Terminal R. Assn. of St. Louis, 342 Mo. 1116, 119 S.W. 2d 363
(1938).
252 A striking example is presented by a case of an 18 year old brakeman,
earning $250 a month, who had lost a leg and a thumb, sustained other fractures,
and gotten osteomyelitis. At the first trial he was given a verdict of $175,000, and
a new trial was ordered when he refused to remit $50,000. The verdict at the
second trial was for $203,167. This verdict was held to be excessive by the "com-
parable verdicts" test, and a third trial ordered. Jones v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 353
Mo. 163, 182 S.W. 2d 157 (1944). At this point the weary plaintiff dismissed his
state court action, sued in federal court, and got a verdict of $150,000, which was
paid. See 5 NACCA L. 3. 225 (1950).
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past, but the), are not increased if the jury awards Jess than some other
jury has awarded for similar injuries."5 3 Finally, the number of factors
which should bear on damages is so great that it is naive to suppose that
there will often be a precedent truly comparable.
A favorite argument of courts anxious to find a verdict excessive
is to compare the verdict with the amount the injured person could have
received were he subject to the state's workmen's compensation law.251
By this test any tort verdict will look excessive."' The whole theory
of workmen's compensation is that the few who might have recovered
in a tort action give up the large verdict they could have had in order
that their fellow workmen, who could not have recovered at common
law, may receive some bare subsistence payments. Further, most people
would agree that compensation payments are extremely inadequate, and
would cringe from suggesting them as the standard for tort verdicts.
Quite similar to the workmen's compensation argument is the com-
parison, in a death case, with the amount that could have been recovered
in a suit under the state wrongful death act.26  Many states have an
arbitrary limit on wrongful death actions. But Congress, like the legis-
latures of many other states, did not choose to write such a limitation into
FELA, and the courts would not be justified in adding such a limit
under the guise of reviewing excessive verdicts.
25 7
A favorite technique in recent cases is to calculate the amount which
plaintiff could receive in interest on the verdict given him, compare this
with his past earnings history, and point out that he could enjoy this
bountiful interest and at the end of his life still have the principal sum
intact.2 s But this completely ignores pain and suffering, possibilities of
future advancement, embarrassment and humiliation, the cost of future
medical care, and all the other elements above mere loss of earnings
which the jury must take into consideration. 2 59
Those judges who have been most frank in cutting verdicts do not
253"Present verdicts doubtless seem very high in view of past experience in
this state, but it is just as valid a conclusion that injured men may have been
awarded too little in the past as it is that they are awarded too much now."
Bennett v. Denver & R.G.W. R. Co., 117 Utah 57, 73, 213 P. 2d 325, 332 (1950).
See also the criticism of the comparison of verdicts test in Hahn v. Moore, 133
N.E. 2d 900, 908 (Ind. App. 1956).
254 E.g., Virginian Ry. Co. v. Armentrout, 166 F. 2d 400,407 (4th Cir. 1946);
Bennett v. Denver R.R.G.W. R. Co., 117 Utah 57,70-1, 213 P. 2d 325,331 (1950).
255See Wolfe, J., concurring, in Bennett v. Denver & R.G.W. R. Co., 117
Utah 57,72, 213 F. 2d 235, 332 (1950).
256 E.g., United States v. Guyer, 218 F. 2d 266,268 (4th Cir. 1954) ; Becksted
v. Skelly Oil Co., 131 F. Supp. 940, 944 (D.Minn. 1955).
257 Western & A. R.R. v. Burnett, 79 Ga. App. 530, 54 S.E. 2d 357 (1949).
258E.g., Southern Ry. Co. v. Neese, 216 F. 2d 772, 775-6 (4th Cir. 1954),
reed 350 U.S. 77 (1955); Virginian Ry. Co. v. Armentrout, 166 F. 2d 400, 407
(4th Cir. 194S); Hallada v. Great Northern Ry., 244 Minn. 81, 97-8, 69 N.W. 2d
673, 686 (1955), cert. denied 350 U.S. S74 (1955).
259 See, e.g., Thompson v. Barnes, 236 S.W. 2d 656, 661 (Tex. Civ. App.
1950); Western & A.R.R. v. Burnett, 79 Ga. App. 530, 540, 54 S.E. 2d 357, 365
(1949); cf. Rivera v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 299 P. 2d 1090 (N.M. 1956).
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hide their reasons behind these pseudo-mathematical tests. These judges
object to big verdicts merely because they are big:
The way the amounts awarded in verdicts in personal injury
cases have been rapidly increasing is a matter of concern to all
who are interested in a fair and orderly administration of justice.
If the amounts awarded in the next decade keep pace with the
rate at which they increased in the last decade, in certain areas
at least, verdicts of $150,000, $200,000, $250,000 or even
greater sums may be expected. Even allowing for the decreased
purchasing power of the dollar, many of the recent large awards
for damages are not justified.2"'
One wonders on what theory of judicial notice the final sentence of the
quoted excerpt rests. Or again:
* * *[T]he maintenance of verdicts at a reasonable level is
essential to the systematic functioning of our economic and
business system. Distorted figures, if persistently reached in
jury verdicts, will result in grave maladjustments and gross
injustices. Plaintiff argues that such 'pseudo-economic' consid-
erations have no place in a court decision. The Court feels
otherwise. Judicial decisions must be rendered with a conscious-
ness of all aspects of our society. Our law has been evolved for
the purpose of regulating society.26 '
A state supreme court sounded a similar note, saying that "judicial care
must be exercised lest a fatal financial burden be placed upon the industry
out of sympathy for the plaintiff. 21 02 We agree with that thought. But
we think courts should be even more assiduous to prevent a fatal financial
burden from being allowed to remain on the injured workman out of
sympathy for the industry.
To strike the balance true between employer and employee is the
function of the jury. At the heart of all the arguments about appellate
review are conflicting views on the jury system. A court which trusts
the jury26 ---or which is at least willing to allow the jury to function
260 Wetherbee v. Elgin, J. & E. Ry. Co., 191 F. 2d 302, 309 (7th Cir. 1951),
cert. denied 346 U.S. 867 (1953).
2611Becksted v. Skelly Oil Co., 131 F. Supp. 940, 944 (D.Minn. 1955).
262 Ahlstrom v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S.S.M. R. Co., 244 Minn. 1, 27, 68
NAV. 2d 873, 889 (1955).
2 63 The United States Supreme Court has long been such a court. One of
its most famous expressions on this subject is in Sioux City & Pac. R.R. Co. v.
Stout, 84 U.S. 657, 663 (1874): "Twelve men of the average of the community,
comprising men of education and men of little education, men of learning and
men whose learning consists only in what they have themselves seen and heard,
the merchant, the mechanic, the farmer, the laborer; these sit together, consult.
apply their separate experience of the affairs of life to the facts proven, and draw
a unanimous conclusion. This average judgment thus given it is the great effort
of the law to obtain. It is assumed that twelve men know more of the common
affairs of life than does one man; that they can draw wiser and safer conclusions
from admitted facts thus occurring, than can a single judge."
For a collection of other encomia, see the rather bizarre opinion in Appli-
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until our people adopt some new and supposedly better system-will leave
the award of damages to the jury. A court which thinks that the jury
is a useless appendage left over from an older day, somewhat on the same
order with judicial wigs and the colorful language with which bailiffs
Open court, is going to ignore the jury and decide the amount of damages
for itself. On this issue, we are glad to stand up and be counted. The
most candid statement for appellate review is in a prophetic dissent by
Judge Stephens, arguing that the appellate court should reduce a verdict
whenever it thinks it is too high:
While I fully realize the touchiness of a court's interference
with a jury's judgment, I cannot believe that our system of
jurisprudence places everybody's material fortune, such as our
free enterprise enables us to accumulate, at the unbridled whim
of any twelve men and women no matter how good and true
they may be. 264.
We agree with the statement of the Florida Supreme Court:
It must be left to the judgment and discretion of the jury what
in dollars and cents is just and fair compensation for damages
or injuries sustained by the fault or negligence of another.
While the award is subject to review by an appellate court, we
are not justified in disturbing it unless we find it to have been
influenced by improper motives. To do otherwise would be to
do away with our jury system. 2 0
cation of "Committee for the Preservation of the Constitutional Right to Trial
by Jury, Inc.," 151 N.Y.S. 2d 1005 (Sup. Ct. 1956).
2G4 Southern Pac. Co. v. Guthrie, 186 F. 2d 926, 934 (9th Cir. 1951)
(dissenting opinion).
2d65Merwin v. Kellems, 78 So. 2d 865, 867 (Fla. 1955). See also the fine
. tatement of Judge Gibson quoted p. 453 above.
